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I. INTRODUCTION: THE FINANCE MINISTER'S NIGHTMARE
The Finance Minister of Moratoria, a medium sized Latin Ameri-
can (or perhaps East European) country, woke one morning in a cold
sweat. His dream had gone something like this:
Inflation had left the currency (for want of a better name, the
peso) overvalued, and when a series of political crises rocked the
country, the foreign exchange dealers began to sell the peso which
continued to plummet for the next week to half its earlier value. In
recent years, Moratoria had got into the habit of increasing and rolling
over its short term debt.' With the drop in the peso, the external debt
(denominated in US Dollars, Deutsche Marks and Yen) immediately
doubled in value. The government had spent its foreign reserves try-
ing to prop up the peso and suddenly faced debt payments in the next
six months of several billion dollars.
Nothing unusual in this dream - it had all happened before. So
the Finance Minister hopped on a plane to New York. His first stop
was the hedge fund managers who were largely responsible for the
turbulence in the currency markets. "Everything's going to be all
right," he assured them, citing vague unsupported statistics. Never-
theless, the next day the peso fell another 10%. Seeking emergency
borrowing, his next stop was the offices of Citibank where he met the
head of Syndicated Loans. "The Chairman has refused authority to
lend, I'm afraid," said the banker. "It's just not the '80s any more."
When the Finance Minister met with similar responses from other
banks in New York that day, he took the next shuttle to Washington,
D.C.
His first stop in D.C. was the U.S. Treasury Department. "Mori-
what?" asked the Secretary to the Treasury. "That's not near enough
to the border to raise the immigration issue, Congress will never
agree, and we spent our stabilization fund on Mexico. Sorry, try the
IMF."2
1 Perhaps Moratoria's Treasury Department had retired much of its Brady debt by issuing
short and medium term Eurobonds. This way the collateral tied up in Brady Bonds could be
used for the lofty social program promised by the government in its election campaign.
2 The solution to a similar crisis in Mexico at the beginning of 1995 involved a $50 billion
loan package, $20 billion of which came from the United States Exchange Stabilization Fund.
The stabilization fund was primarily intended to defend the US dollar in currency crises.
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The Finance Minister walked down Pennsylvania Avenue to the
offices of the International Monetary Fund. "We can't cover it all,"
said the IMF Director. "Sure, the G10 doubled the General Agree-
ment to Borrow, so we have access to more money now, but you are
asking for more a multi-billion dollar liquidity facility, and if we had to
do this for everybody, we'd run out of money. Also, we'd be bailing
out investors again, and our member governments don't want to get
into that expensive habit. What we can do is give you some temporary
liquidity, but first you have to reach some accommodation with your
creditors."
The Finance Minister took the next shuttle back to New York to
meet his creditors. When his car dropped him on Wall Street, he
looked up at the towering offices surrounding him and, with a sinking
heart, realized that he had no idea where to begin.
In a future sovereign debt crisis, debt restructurings are inevitable
simply because there is no alternative. Private lending becomes sim-
ply unavailable. The commercial banks were asked to lend to Mexico
in early 1995 as part of the U.S. Government rescue plan, but the
money never materialized.3 The banks' experience of involuntary
lending during the 1980s debt crisis was so unpleasant that they are
unlikely to increase exposure to a troubled debtor in a crisis today.
Other sources of finance are no more likely to yield support. Mexico
was unable to return to the capital markets until six months after the
crisis blew up.4 For political and practical reasons, the U.S. govern-
ment is unlikely to lend again as it did to Mexico. Despite recent in-
creases in the IMF's power to lend to countries in emergencies,
multilateral funds remain insufficient to cope with large scale crises.
In any case, just as it did in the 1980s, the IMF would probably condi-
tion any finance upon some debt restructuring agreement between the
debtor and its creditors. Coupled with the absence of new money, this
means that countries will have to try to reach some agreement with
their creditors.
However, the current legal and institutional framework is embar-
rassingly unprepared to handle a sovereign debt restructuring. An
enormous amount of emerging market sovereign debt is now in bonds,
3 Richard Waters & Leslie Crawford, Banks Pull Out of $3bn Role in Mexican Rescue, FiN.
Trvms, Mar. 23,1995, at 20; Tinothy L. O'Brien, Prospects Dim for Bank Loan to Mexico, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 13, 1995, at A3.
4 Prediction: No Mexican, Argentine Issues for 6 Months, LDC DEBT REORT, Jan. 30, 1995,
at 11. The first issue of Mexican sovereign debt did not come until July 1995. Leslie Crawford,
Mexican Bonds Welcomed, FIN. TimFs, July 11, 1995, at 3. See also, Daniel Dombey, Mexico to
Restructure Debt Through $500m Bond Issue, FIN. Tinms, July 26, 1995, at 4.
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spread across a vast international market of different types of inves-
tors who are often holding the debt for very short periods of time. A
debt work-out today involving bonds would be prohibitively difficult
to organize for reasons that I will explain in Chapter II.
The world financial system now needs a mechanism for govern-
ment debtors and their creditors to coordinate a debt work-out in such
crises. In practical terms, a work-out system must accomplish two
things. First, it must enable creditors and debtors to negotiate debt
reschedulings whereby the timing of payments is postponed, or debt
reduction whereby the burden of debt is reduced. Second, it must
make new lending to the debtor country possible so as to provide li-
quidity, restoring it to immediate debt servicing capability.
I begin in Chapter II by explaining three mechanical problems
that would be encountered by a country and its creditors if they at-
tempted a debt restructuring in the current legal and institutional
framework. These must be addressed to set up a system in which debt
renegotiations are possible. They are first, with most sovereign debt
now taking the form of bonds, there are no obvious parties to play a
leadership role when a crisis arises. Second, there is no coordination
mechanism for the large number and variety of ever-changing credi-
tors to act together. Third, even if there were such leadership and
coordination, creditors have no individual incentive to act together be-
cause they lack solidarity of interests. In each case, I compare these
problems to the experience in the 1980s crisis and show how dramati-
cally more difficult a sovereign debt work-out is today.
In the third chapter, I develop policy guidelines for constructing a
sovereign debt work-out system, partly in response to Jeffrey Sach's
proposal of an international bankruptcy court. In Chapter IV, I con-
sider how bondholder councils operated in New York and London in
the 19th and early 20th centuries and suggest that similar institutions
could contribute to solve the mechanical problems explained in Chap-
ter II.
I set out a blueprint for a sovereign debt work-out system in
Chapter V. The problem of leadership could be solved by requiring
sovereign debt issued in the United States to be governed by the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 with an Indenture Trustee taking some respon-
sibility for bondholders in a default situation. Debt issued elsewhere,
such as in the United Kingdom, could be made subject to similar legis-
lation. I address the problem of coordination by exploring how bond-
holder councils might be structured. I develop two possible structures
and suggest that governments need to set up institutions which will
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enable bondholders to appoint their own representatives. In the third
part of the fifth chapter, I consider possible solutions to the problem
of bondholder solidarity. I begin with James Hurlock's suggestion that
sovereign immunity be granted to governments in a crisis so that
bondholders have no choice but to negotiate with the debtor. I then
consider Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes' proposal that the
provisions of future debt instruments be changed so that a majority of
bondholders under an issue of bonds have the legal power to restruc-
ture the entire issue. Finding problems with these suggestions, I set
forth a new proposal which could effectively combine bondholders'
interests. Solving these three problems will make restructurings possi-
ble without encountering the policy difficulties of other current
proposals.
I offer some remarks in Chapter VI on bringing in new money for
the troubled debtor and suggest that the recommendations in the pre-
ceding chapter will facilitate new lending from commercial banks by
making it easier for existing creditors to give the new money priority
over the outstanding debt.
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING TODAY: THREE PROBLEMS
When a crisis occurs...
Debt crises come in different ways. In Mexico's crisis at the be-ginning of 1995, the local currency was suddenly massively devalued
against the U.S. dollar.' The government's reserves were severely de-
pleted and large amounts of Mexican debt effectively denominated in
U.S. dollars suddenly became much more expensive to service.6 The
1980s Latin American debt crisis was another example of how macro-
economic factors can increase the cost of servicing government debt.
Rising interest rates made the external debt more expensive while
falling commodity prices reduced foreign currency reserves from ex-
port earnings. 7 Latin American governments did not have the foreign
5 By the end of March 1995, the new peso had fallen by almost 50% in foreign currency
terms since the exchange rate was allowed to float in December 1994. World Economic Out-
look, 39 IMF annual report, Oct. 1995. See also Robert L. Bartley, Mexico: Suffering the Con-
ventional Wisdom, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at A14; Craig Torres & Paul B. Carroll, Mexico
Reverses Currency Policy; Peso Falls 12.7%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1994, at A3.
6 Craig Torres, Mexico's Central Bank Struggles as Reserves Reach Severe Lows, WAu.L ST.
J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A8.
7 Debt Crises are often produced by factors beyond the countries' control. For example,
developing countries which did not depend upon oil revenues suffered in the global recession
from collapsed trade and high interest rates. World Economic Outlook 56-57 (International
Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 21, 1983). See also Vito Tanzi, Fiscal Policy Responses to
Exogenous Shocks in Developing Countries, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 88, 89-90 (1986).
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reserves to pay for the increasingly expensive debt burden.8 Like fall-
ing dominoes, countries announced that they could not pay their
debts.
... there is a downward spiral...
When a country's foreign reserves run low or the cost of its debt
increases, debt payments become more difficult. When the problem
looks overwhelming, lenders consider the debtor too risky and be-
come reluctant to lend. This produces a downward spiral: the debtor
cannot afford to pay its debt, so potential sources of borrowing lose
confidence and dry up. This in turn further damages the debtor's
liquidity.
• . .which the GIO initiative anticipates with an IMF lender of last
resort..
Principally as a reaction to the sudden and overwhelming nature
of the Mexican crisis, world leaders agreed to double the emergency
funds of the International Monetary Fund.9 The "General Agreement
to Borrow," whereby the IMF may draw upon the funds of G10 gov-
ernments and Saudi Arabia, has been increased to US$52 billion. This
greatly increases official lending power for the sort of liquidity crises
experienced by Mexico. It enhances the IMF's capacity as a lender of
last resort.
The theory of the lender of last resort was first set out by Bage-
hot. He explained that if there were an institution ready to guarantee
liquidity when the lending community doubted the debtor's liquidity,
then commercial lenders would have confidence that new loans would
be repaid. They would therefore be willing to lend to the debtor, al-
beit at penalty rates reflecting the greater risk.
... but this may undermine market discipline...
However, an increased IMF lending facility without a mechanism
for renegotiating the debt may cause market distortions. Bond prices
fluctuate for a number of reasons. One reason is the likelihood of
payment on the debt. If a debtor looks like defaulting, the value of
the debt will decrease as the market internalizes the risk. However, if
8 According to Morgan Guaranty Bank, in 1982, the ratio of debt service payments to ex-
ports was 179% in Argentina, 129% in Mexico, 122% in Brazil, 116% in Chile, and 95% in
Venezuela (the five largest debtors). International Lending: Implications of a Slowdown,
WORLD FN. MARKE-rs, Oct. 1982, at 1 tbl. 5 [hereinafter International Lending]. By 1982, the
ratio of debt to exports of goods and services had reached 144%. Their ratio of debt to GDP
had reached 36%. E. Brau et al., Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings with Official and
Bank Creditors 4 tbl. 1 (International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 25, 1983).
9 Robert Chote, George Graham and John Gapper, IMF set to get more crisis cash, FIN.
TIMns, Oct. 9, 1995.
Towards a Sovereign Debt
16:57 (1995)
the market is aware that official funds are available to supply credit to
the ailing debtor, the value will not drop so markedly and investors
will not bear the loss of value. It may "undermine market discipline
as investors rely on the international community rather than monitor-
ing country risks."10
..at the cost of the public sector and without solving the problem.
This is at the cost of the public sector. The capital of the IMF is
supplied by governments. By organizing the $50 billion Mexican loan
package, the United States, the IMF and other governments bore the
immediate cost of Mexico's collapse. Supporting Mexico as a model
emerging market country was arguably a valid United States public
policy because of its proximity to the United States. Moreover, the
potential impact on other developing economies demanded a drastic
solution. However, volunteering public funds in such situations is not
a sustainable habit, particularly if maintaining market confidence re-
quires the same scale of lending as Mexico. History has shown that
debt crises tend to be regional shocks (Mexico's contained crisis in
January had serious effects on its neighbors with Argentina borrowing
substantially from the IMF). If Mexico needed the assurance of $50
billion, IMF funds would soon be exhausted if more than one country
ran out of external finance. As I explained in the introductory chap-
ter, private finance will probably be unavailable in a crisis. This leaves
the only option of restructuring the debt.
A country and its creditor bondholders seeking to restructure the
debt today will encounter three fundamentally mechanical problems.
First, there is no obvious location of leadership responsibility for the
creditors. Second, there is no coordination mechanism to enable cred-
itors to negotiate collectively with the debtor. Third, individual credi-
tors have no incentive to come to a collective solution because it will
almost certainly involve a loss on their investments. They thus lack
solidarity. If governments directly addressed these three problems of
leadership, coordination and solidarity, they could set up a successful
work-out mechanism for sovereign debt.
A. Leadership With No Indenture Trustee
Bank Advisory Committees in the 1980s provided leadership...
During the prolonged Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the
structure of the debt made it relatively easy for leaders to emerge
which guided the creditor banks in the debt negotiations. The vast
10 Lawrence Summers, Summers on Mexico, Ten Lessons to Learn, ECONoMIsT, Dec. 23,
1995, at 62.
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majority of the debt was in the form of syndicated bank loans. In a
syndicated loan, a group (syndicate) of banks makes loans to a debtor
under an agreement that binds all of the member banks to the basic
payment terms as a lending group. The terms of a syndicated loan
typically provide for ratable sharing of payments among the syndicate
and cannot be altered by individual syndicate members. Decision-
making authority and coordinating responsibility on several issues is
usually ceded to the lead banks. The commercial banks therefore ef-
fectively had representatives which renegotiated the debt with the
governments."
Countries invited the banks to negotiate by forming an advisory
committee.'2 Bank Advisory Committees (BACs) emerged, consist-
ing of the lead banks which had organized the syndicated loans.
These committees preferred not to be understood formally as repre-
sentatives but as "communications links" on account of their lack of
formal legitimacy.13  The BAGs represented the creditors and gave
advice to the country on how best to progress with the restructuring
considering what might be acceptable to the wider banking commu-
nity.'4 They were informal creatures without the official authority of
the creditor body. Their success was limited by their ability to steer
the situation towards a consensus between the debtors and the syndi-
cate banks which still had to accept the terms suggested. They-ob-
tained cooperation among the hundreds of creditor banks by making
recommendations for a restructuring which they then imposed using
their political leverage. Despite their lack of formal legitimacy, they
operated much as a creditor committee might, effectively negotiating
11 See Lee Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, Inter-Creditor Issues in Debt Restructuring, in LATIN
AMERICAN SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 28 (Ralph
Reisner et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter, Buchheit & Reisner, Inter-Creditor Issues].
12 See A Nightmare of Debt: A Survey of International Banking, ECONOMIsr, Mar. 20, 1982
at 27; Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks,
Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 65 (1984). In the
earlier restructurings, these committees were large and unwieldy but by 1984 they had become
smaller and more efficient. William C.F. Kurz, Problem Loans and Sovereign Restructurings: An
Introduction to International Workout Practices, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW, (Robert
Rendell ed., Euromoney Publications (1983)). The responsibilities of the advisory committees
included assembling information on the sovereign borrower's financial state of affairs, negotiat-
ing the broad terms of a restructuring and new money deal, negotiating the legal document
which implements the deal and persuading the international banking community to accept the
deal. Lee Buchheit, Advisory Committees: What's in a Name?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 9, 1991 at
9.
13 Mudge, supra note 12, at 65. "The formation and role of a bank advisory group is informal
and without legal recognition, either as a matter of contract or as a matter of law." Mudge,
supra note 12, at 64.
14 Mudge, supra note 12, at 65.
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restructuring agreements and new money loans, mobilizing the com-
mercial banks to participate in these agreements and passing informa-
tion to the other creditors. Thus there were parties which were
identifiably responsible to guide the process of debt negotiations.
... as does the Indenture Trustee in America for corporate bonds...
The vast majority of sovereign debt now takes the form of bonds
rather than bank loans. In a crisis today, there is no provision for
coordinated representation and leadership. Corporate bonds in the
United States illustrate by comparison the lack of leadership for gov-
ernment bondholders. When a U.S. corporation defaults on its bond
debt, corporate bondholders enjoy legal protection under the Trustee
Indenture Act of 1939. Government bondholders do not have this
protection 15 because the statute expressly excludes domestic and for-
eign government bonds.'6
Corporate bonds are usually issued through an Indenture Trustee.
In the event of a default, the Trustee has specific obligations to bond-
holders.17 This makes collective action by bondholders possible where
otherwise it would be difficult and expensive.' 8 It acts as a communi-
cations center and so coordinates bondholders, enabling them to
make collective decisions. It must follow any instructions from a ma-
jority of the bondholders and so plays a representative role. If bond-
holders do not give directions, the Trustee may unilaterally accelerate
the balance due, recover a judgment against the obligor, or sue to en-
force the covenants of the indenture.19 The Trustee has "primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing the remedial provisions of the contract."2 It
15 See Charles P. Goodall, Eurobonds Issued with the Benefits of Trust Deeds, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Feb. 1983, at 19.
16 The Trust Indenture Act exempts securities issued by foreign governments, their subdivi-
sions, municipalities, and instrumentalities. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 304(a)(6), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ddd(a)(6) (1988).
17 The trustee becomes a fiduciary, and the standard of care changes (from a good faith
standard) to require "the same degree of care and skill... as a prudent man would exercise or
use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs" to prevent injury to bondholders'
interests. The trustee is required to give notice of the default to the security holders and keep
the bondholders informed of the borrower's behavior regarding the bonds. 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77oo0(c) (West Supp. 1994). The trustees will not be liable, however, for errors made in good
faith. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ooo(d)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
18 Louis Loss & JOEL SEIGMAN, 4 SEcutrrms REGULA-TION 1596 (1990).
19 Henry F. Johnson, The 'Forgotten' Securities Statute: Problems in the Trust Indenture Ac
13 TOLEDO L. R. 92,100 (1981). The trustees are also empowered by the Act to excuse defaults
on interest payments for up to three years with the consent of 75% of the bondholders. 15
U.S.C.A. § 77ppp(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
20 Albert S. Pergam, Eurobonds: Trustees, Fiscal Agents and the Treatment of Default in Ad-
aptation and Renegotiation of Contracts, in INTERNATONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 285 (Nobert
Horn ed. 1984), at 337.
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will commence bankruptcy proceedings, attend reorganization pro-
ceedings, vigilantly monitor the actions of a bankruptcy trustee, file
petitions with the bankruptcy court, sit on creditor committees, per-
haps petition the Court for the creation of additional committees, per-
haps negotiate with the debtor and recommend reorganization plans
to the bondholders.21 The Trustee has a leadership role in a corporate
bond default.
• . but the Fiscal Agent for sovereign bonds has no leadership role...
There is no party responsible for taking these actions for holders
of sovereign bonds. Because the 1939 Act does not cover sovereign
bonds, most issued in the United States use a Fiscal Agent instead of
an Indenture Trustee. The Fiscal Agent, which is also used in the
United Kingdom in bond offerings, has a much weaker role than the
U.S. Indenture Trustee. Among other things, fiscal agency agree-
ments define the obligations of the Fiscal Agent which receives pay-
ments from the debtor and distributes the interest and principal to
bondholders. 22 These agreements usually require the Fiscal Agent to
give notice to the bondholders in several circumstances: if the debtor
fails to deposit sufficient funds to pay the interest due; if a bondholder
claims that an "event of default" or "default" has occurred; or if the
bonds have been accelerated. Fiscal agency agreements expressly
stipulate, however, that the agent acts solely as an agent for the issuer
and does not have any fiduciary relationship to the bondholders, ex-
cept with respect to the payments held in trust for them.
... even with Brady Bonds, which causes problems in default situations.
Brady Bonds constitute a large amount of Latin American and
Eastern European external debt currently outstanding. Although the
Brady Bond Fiscal Agent has more responsibility than most, it still
plays a markedly weaker role than the Indenture Trustee plays in cor-
porate bond defaults. Despite its duty to appoint a chairperson at
bondholder meetings, the Fiscal Agent has neither the power nor the
duty to represent bondholders or take action on their behalf. The Fis-
cal Agent assumes no leadership role to advise or represent the bond-
holders. Not having an Indenture Trusteeship system for sovereign
bonds is a problem in a default situation. Without an identifiable
21 See generally, Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. and Peter L. Borowitz, The Role of the Indenture
Trustee in Reorganization Cases under the Bankruptcy Code, 102 BANING L.J. 436 (1985).
22 The Argentine Fiscal Agency Agreement, for example, provides that "[A]II funds deliv-
ered to the Fiscal Agent by or on behalf of Argentina... shall be received by the Fiscal Agent
... in trust for the benefit of the Bondholders." USD Discount and Par Bond Fiscal Agency
Agreement Among The Republic of Argentina, Citibank, N.A., and Citibank (Luxembourg)
S.A. 15 (1993) [hereinafter Argentine Fiscal Agency Agreement].
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leader which can coordinate them and has a legal mandate to repre-
sent them, government bondholders are more likely to remain a mass
of unorganized creditors following a default.
B. Coordination With No Coordinating Mechanism
Syndicated lending during the 1980s made it possible to coordinate
creditors...
Rescheduling debt requires organizing all of the creditors to
agree together over negotiations with the debtor. The creditors were
easily identifiable during the 1980s crisis - they were the banks which
were members of loan syndicates. As the lead banks of the syndicates
had organized the syndicate in the first place, they knew which banks
were in the syndicate.23 Banks which had purchased loans on the sec-
ondary market could be traced. This made communication and deci-
sion-making possible.
.. but today bondholders are harder to organize.
Today's creditors hold individual bonds whose only relation to
each other is that the bonds in a series have the same legal terms as
the others in that series and are paid through the same mechanism. In
addition, as bonds are easily tradeable debt instruments, the identities
of bondholders are constantly changing. Identifying and communicat-
ing with bondholders would probably require sending communica-
tions to them through clearance and settlement institutions such as the
Depository Trust Company in the United States or CEDEL and
Euroclear in Europe. Some bonds are bearer instruments which
makes identification and communication almost impossible. Bond-
holders are also hard to organize because of their number. Whereas
the 1980s saw hundreds of syndicate banks, we now have thousands of
bondholders. The volume of creditors and their sectoral diversity
makes decisions difficult to obtain because their variety of interests
may not coincide. No organization and no procedure exists to make
such coordination anything other than a chaotic scramble. Bond-
holder meetings could be organized albeit with difficulty, but, as I will
explain below, the results obtainable from bondholder meetings are
very limited.
Bank Advisory Committees had some political legitimacy in the
1980s...
Although the lead banks of the loan syndicates did not have any
legal mandate to renegotiate the loans, the BACs effectively did so by
23 As the crisis went on, a secondary market developed and syndicated credits were increas-
ingly traded between banks and sold to other institutions.
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recommending outcomes to the debtors which the banking commu-
nity would accept. These outcomes were imposed upon the banks in
the loan syndicates under pressure from the larger banks. Because
the bank syndicates accepted (in varying degrees) that the debt crisis
would be managed through the BACs, the BACs had enough political
legitimacy to overcome their lack of legal mandate to act as
representatives.
... but bondholders cannot reschedule all of the debt at a bondholder
meeting...
Bonds which do not provide for bondholders' meetings leave
bondholders with no obvious way to organize collective action and
appoint representatives. Unlike many Eurobond agreements, the
Brady Bond agreements do provide for bondholder meetings at the
initiative of the bondholders or the sovereign debtor.24 But other
than information exchanges, these meetings cannot accomplish much.
While the bond agreements provide that decisions taken at such meet-
ings are binding on all bondholders, the basic contractual rights of
bondholders cannot (just as would be the case with collective action
under bonds which do not provide for meetings) be changed without
the consent of each holder. For example, Brady Bonds provide that
bondholders acting collectively need the consent of each bondholder
who would be affected by a change of the principal maturity date or
the interest payment date, a reduction of the principal or interest
amounts, or a change of the currency of any payment on a bond.
These are the fundamental ingredients of a debt restructuring. The
ability of bondholders to deal with payment problems through a meet-
ing is therefore very limited, falling short of the power to negotiate a
restructuring of the entire issue.
... or even give a representative a negotiating mandate...
Although bondholders cannot make decisions at meetings that af-
fect the basic terms of all of the bonds, they could vote to authorize a
representative to negotiate such on their behalf. However, those
bondholders who did not appoint the representative would not be
bound by any agreement reached by the representative. If some
bondholders refuse to allow changes to the terms of their bonds, it is
unlikely that even the most virtuous bondholder would volunteer to
restructure its bonds. No creditor wants to take a loss where others
24 If requested by ten percent of the bondholders, the Fiscal Agent must convene a bond-
holder meeting. It must give notice of such meetings and of defaults to all the bondholders. The
Fiscal Agent appoints the chairperson of a bondholder meeting, unless the issuer called the
meeting, in which case the issuer appoints the chairperson.
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refuse to make the same sacrifice. If an equivalent of a Bank Advi-
sory Committee were to be organized for bondholders, it might be
accorded some political legitimacy as a representative committee, but
it is unlikely that it could impose sufficient pressure upon unwilling
bondholders to accept settlements arrived at with debtor govern-
ments. The BACs were sensitive not to be seen as the banks' negotiat-
ing representatives: it would be even harder for an equivalent body of
bondholders to have much influence over the mass of bondholders. I
will explore this problem of creditor solidarity in the next part of this
chapter.
.. so we have a vacuum.
Coordinated representation requires a method for communicat-
ing with bondholders to enable them to make collective decisions and
a mechanism for appointing effective representatives. There is cur-
rently a vacuum: no legal structure, institution or procedure exists to
perform these functions.
C. Solidarity Without Incentives
Without official funds, rescheduling should serve creditors' collective
interests..
If financial support is lacking, it is theoretically in the collective
interest of creditors to renegotiate outstanding debt. Only by
rescheduling the debt or finding new loans can the debtor regain the
liquidity required to service its debt. Finding new loans will depend
upon the extremity of the crisis. If it is not extreme, banks may lend
at penalty rates without any debt reduction.' But in extreme situa-
tions, banks will probably not lend unless given some priority over
existing debt or the existing debt is restructured. If the debt is not
restructured and lending confidence has collapsed, existing funds will
be insufficient to cover all of the obligations. The debtor would prob-
ably then take unilateral action. Brazil declared a moratorium on its
external debt in 1987. Peru imposed an interest ceiling equal to a per-
centage of its GDP through much of the 1980s. Such unilateral action
damages the relationship between the lenders and the borrower. It
only makes it more difficult for a debtor to tap new sources of finance
that would renew its liquidity and enable it to service its debts. Fi-
nance dries up if a debtor takes unpredictable unilateral action. This
in turn only makes the position of existing creditors worse. The value
25 See Paul Krugman, Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors, in DEVELOPING CoUNTRY
DEBT AND ECONOMIC PEMFORMANCE (Jeffrey Sachs ed., 1989).
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of their debt will drop, payments may be missed and they may en-
counter problems with their own balance sheets.
But if creditors can negotiate the debt on terms which the debtor
government is able to meet, they would benefit collectively from the
debtor's enhanced liquidity. Thus, in the absence of a lender of last
resort, it is in their collective interest to agree to restructure. This is
particularly so in the context of sovereign debt because there is very
little hope of receiving payments by a distribution of liquidated assets.
Governments keep few assets abroad for creditors to attach and are
relatively safe at home. Therefore easing the liquidity of the country
must be a priority for creditors.
... but the individual creditor can free ride by refusing to join in.
However, even if a mechanism existed to organize bondholders
to act together, collective decisions are not necessarily in their individ-
ual interests. No creditor wants to take a loss. If some creditors
reschedule their debt, those creditors which retain the face value of
their debt "free ride" because the rescheduling increases liquidity and
enables the free riders to be paid at face value. Knowing that negotia-
tions would result in debt reduction or rescheduling, some bondhold-
ers will inevitably refuse to submit to the results of any negotiations.
This may result in a breakdown of the collective interest so that in the
end no creditor wants to submit its debt for rescheduling.
Free riders came under pressure in the 1980s...
This problem plagued the debt negotiations during the 1980s.
However, in the first few years the lead banks were able to overcome
it. The exposure of the large U.S. banks to Latin American debt in
the early 1980s was such that if the debt had been declared non-repay-
able, those banks would have suffered enormous losses.26 Major
banks would have collapsed, threatening the world financial system.
Smaller banks were less exposed, however. Government bank
regulators and the larger banks pressured the smaller banks to join in
to restructure the existing loans and extend new loans to financially
26 While European banks had concentrated lending to Asian, Middle Eastern and African
Countries, U.S. banks had focused on lending to Latin American countries. See Morgan Guar-
anty Trust Company of New York, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETs, Feb. 1983, at 3. The amount
of loans by Manufacturers Hanover to the five largest borrowers (Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela,
Argentina and Chile) as a percentage of shareholders' equity was 254.7%. This percentage was
198.3% for Chase Manhattan; 179.6% for Chemical Bank; 178.6% for Citicorp; 166.8% for
Bankers' Trust; 145.1% for Bank America; and 134.5% for Morgan Guaranty. ANATOLE
KALETSKY, Tim CosTS OF DEFAULT tbl. 6.3 (1985).
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distressed sovereign debtors.27 Smaller banks involuntarily increased
their exposure to developing country debt. Joseph Kraft, who was in-
volved in the reschedulings, related, "One by one, we identified the
hard cases... We pinpointed their argument or excuse for not going
along. Then we brought the appropriate pressure to bear - some-
times from state or Federal regulators; sometimes from figures in the
local community; sometimes from other bankers."28 These methods
temporarily solved the free rider problem during the initial years of
the debt crisis.29
Moreover, the syndicated loans which were to provide new
money involved all of the creditors in a single agreement, thus provid-
ing strong creditor solidarity and less scope for individual action by
any single creditor separate from a decision by the syndicate.
..but bondholders will not be so easy to influence...
Three factors would make debt rescheduling more difficult in a
bond crisis today. First, it is unlikely that the systemic threat exper-
ienced by the banking industry could be repeated in a form that would
produce sufficient pressures on creditors. Bonds are much more
widely dispersed than syndicated loans were during the 1980s. Even if
political pressures were exerted on bondholders by governments or
creditors, a significant number of bonds will probably be spread
among investors who are not as susceptible to pressure as were the
banks. The banks were a highly homogeneous community of institu-
tions which interacted with and depended upon each other. The
number and sectoral variety of bondholders will make relations be-
tween bondholders more fluid. Their interests do not necessarily
coincide.
.. particularly if they expect official help..
Second, bondholders may hope that official sources will provide
the necessary liquidity to enable their bonds to be paid in full without
a rescheduling. The Mexican crisis has only served to consolidate this
hope. The increase in the IMF's emergency lending facility (the Gen-
eral Agreement to Borrow) adds to this expectation. Bondholders
have no individual incentive to volunteer their bonds for
renegotiation.
27 Charles Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation on Rescheduling Sovereign
Debt, 38 WORLD POL 200 (1985). See also, Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Sustaining Lender Commit-
ment to Sovereign Debtors, 30 COLuM. J. TRAN NAT'L L. 1, 24 (1992).
28 JOSEPH KRAr-r, Tim MEXICAN RESCUE, 26, 53 (1984).
29 The free rider problem worsened as the 1980s negotiations proceeded. See Lee Buchheit,
Unseating Free Riders, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 1989, at 14.
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.. and can bring lawsuits to disrupt negotiations...
A third factor making collective action and rescheduling difficult
is the maverick bondholder which seeks redress in a court. As I have
explained elsewhere,30 bondholders can expect to obtain a judgment
in a United States or United Kingdom court. Moreover, they will.
For example, one of Brazil's creditors which held a large amount of
bank loans brought a lawsuit in 1994 to enforce Brazil's obligations
under the loans.31 Peru has also recently been sued for its debt. In
fact, some law firms are now advertising their expertise in suing for-
eign government debtors.
There were very few lawsuits by banks during the 1980s for a
number of reasons. Legally, the banks could have brought suits over
their loans: New York law or English law usually controlled the loan
agreements, and neither of these countries apply foreign sovereign im-
munity to sovereign bonds.32 In addition, all the loan agreements con-
tained clauses waiving any right to plead sovereign immunity. But
banks faced severe political consequences for suing and thereby
breaking down the creditor solidarity which could help resolve the cri-
sis. Smaller banks especially could not bring an action without dam-
aging their positions within the banking community.
The nature of syndicated lending further hindered banks from su-
ing on the debt. It made it very difficult for individual banks to take
unilateral action. Syndicated loans contained contractual provisions
30 Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN'Fop J. INT'L L. 305 (1995).
31 In 1994, after Brazil had prepared its $52 billion bank debt restructuring and Brady Bonds
issue, Brazil's largest single creditor, the Dart Family, refused to join the restructuring. The Dart
Family brought suit in federal court in New York, seeking payment of interest arrears. The Dart
Family was technically Brazil's second largest creditor under the loan agreement in question. In
September 1994, Banco Do Brasil held roughly 52% of the outstanding loans under the Multi-
Year Deposit Facility Agreement (MYDFA) loans which was $1.58 billion, more than the $1.38
billion held by the Dart Family. Under loan agreements, the Agent banks (Citibank, NA) could
declare an acceleration at the request of banks holding more than 50% of the aggregate unpaid
principal of the MYDFA debt. The Darts argued that although Banco Do Brasil held over 50%
of the outstanding debt, it should have been disregarded for the purposes of determining which
party holds more than 50% because Banco Do Brasil was acting as "the alter-ego of, under the
control of, and under common control with, defendant Central Bank, the borrower and Brasil,
the guarantor." The Darts argument was therefore that they held over 50% of the vote and
should be entitled to an accelerated payment of "the entire unpaid principal amount of the
MYDFA, all past due interest, and all other amounts payable under the MYDFA." That such a
large creditor would be prepared to go to such lengths to assert its legal rights and unsettle the
restructuring process only serves to emphasize the danger of unrestrained smaller creditors.
32 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 617-19 (1992); see also George R.
Delaume, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years
Later, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1994); George R. Delaume, Sovereign Immunity and Public Debt,
23 INT'L LAW 811 (1989).
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which reduced the return any individual bank could expect from a
lawsuit. The most important provision was the sharing clause. This
mandated that any recovery in an action by a single creditor had to be
shared with all of the other creditors of the loan agreement, thereby
significantly reducing the recovery of the single creditor bringing the
action. The political costs of an action therefore sufficiently out-
weighed the benefits to preclude individual creditors from taking ac-
tion.33 As the debt crisis progressed, creditors used such provisions
more widely to cover all other creditors. The strength of this func-
tional stay on proceedings was considerable: neither Brazil (which
suspended interest payments in 1987), nor Peru (which limited its in-
terest payments through much of the 1980s) were subject to legal ac-
tions by their creditor banks until much later.
• . .so the creditor body lacks the solidarity necessary to agree to
restructure.
It would be very hard to impose political pressure upon a group
as diverse and large as bondholders. In addition, bondholders are not
bound together in the same way as lenders are under syndicated loans.
In particular, bonds do not contain sharing clauses. Without fierce
political disincentives against bringing a lawsuit, yet expecting to as-
sert their legal rights in court, at least some bondholders will surely
sue. The possibility of even a few bondholders pursuing their full
rights will undermine bondholder solidarity: no creditor wants to take
a loss while others enjoy full payments made possible by the
rescheduling. Even without the prospect of attaching assets - diffi-
cult against a foreign government - some creditors may use lawsuits
as a disruptive negotiating tool to bring pressure on the debtor and
their fellow creditors. For these reasons, even if a work-out procedure
or organization existed, bondholders do not have enough solidarity to
agree to restructure the debt.
III. A POLICY FRAMEWORK
Bankruptcy systems traditionally protect creditors from each other...
The underlying rationale of corporate bankruptcy systems helps
develop an approach to sovereign debt work-outs. Bankruptcy sys-
tems regulate competition over limited and rapidly depleting re-
sources. Creditors' rights to be paid are suspended and they are
obliged to submit to a group solution accepted by a majority of the
creditors. The policy reasons for disturbing creditors' plain contrac-
33 Lee C. Buchheit, The Sharing Clause as a Litigation Shield, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1990
at 15; Buchheit & Reisner, Inter-Creditor Issues, supra note 11, at 48.
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tual rights were historically to protect creditors from each other.
Without assurance of a group solution, individuals will pre-empt other
creditors by seeking their share of the assets, leading to a stampede
for resources, leaving some creditors with nothing. Bankruptcy sys-
tems control the vultures, but for the vultures' own protection. The
method is to force the creditors to face the problem as a single group
rather than as scattered individuals. This solves the "creditors' di-
lemma," the bankruptcy version of the prisoners' dilemma.34
This "collectivization goal ' 35 of bankruptcy regimes produces cer-
tain features. As the bankruptcy crisis is one of resource availability,
the rapid depletion of resources is stopped by an automatic stay on
legal proceedings pending an orderly administration of the various
claims. 6 The problem is competition between creditors, so equality
regulates opportunity and initiative by imposing "equal treatment"
among creditors.37 Because it involves decision-making by creditors
among themselves and negotiation with the debtor, the process pro-
vides for the coordination and representation of creditors. Simple
Rawlsian justice38 ensures equity between creditors and, in its more
34 See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter Jackson, The Creditors' Bargain]; Thomas H. Jack-
son, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonban-
kruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399 (1986) [hereinafter Jackson, Of Liquidation]; Thomas H.
Jackson and Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989); David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory
and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CiNN. L. REv. 453 (1992); on the historical evolution of bank-
ruptcy policies, see Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REv. 1,14
(1919); Risenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REv. 401,406 (1947);
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325.
35 Jackson, Of Liquidation, supra note 34, at 399.
36 11 U.S.C. § 362. In relation to sovereign debt: "Given the absence of any equivalent to
domestic bankruptcy procedures, the litigation process cannot offer a solution to the crisis. On
the other hand, litigation by individual fringe creditors - perhaps aimed at forcing the hand of
other creditors in interbank negotiations - has considerable potential to impede an orderly
solution through voluntary rescheduling." Howse, The Courts, International Debt Crisis, and the
Dilemma of Rescheduling: Rethinking the Allied Bank Decision, 46 U. ToRoro FAC. L. REv.
578, 594 (1988).
37 "The theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution'..." Nathanson v. NLRB,
344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952).
38 Jackson presents "bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the agreement one would
expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such agreement from
an ex ante position." Jackson, Of Liquidation, supra note 34, at 455. Korobkin criticizes Jackson
for limiting those behind the veil of ignorance to creditors, making creditor wealth maximization
the primary goal: Korobkin includes the debtors, their employees and communities in the deci-
sion, justifying Chapter 11 reorganization. See Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the
Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEx. L. REv. 541, 544 (1993).
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morally generous 39 and economically optimistic4 ° form, shows mercy
to debtors by providing a "fresh start" and "reorganization," promis-
ing forgiveness and time to get things together.
.. but a sovereign work-out system must also protect the debtor.
Debates over whether reorganization or liquidation is more effi-
cient for failing corporate debtors41 are inappropriate in the context of
government debtors: there can be no talk of an economically efficient
liquidation and distribution of a people's government. Companies
may go down, but governments must not.42 This point necessarily in-
forms the policy issues surrounding governments in financial distress.
While bankruptcy systems have traditionally originated in the credi-
tors' dilemma without great concern for the debtor,43 we must assume
that protection of the sovereign debtor is a greater policy objective
than protection of its creditors. The modes by which the creditors'
dilemma is resolved are as important for the protection of sovereign
debtors as for their creditors.44 The purpose of uniting creditors can-
not only be to regulate competition among themselves. It must also
enable the debtor to continue to function as a government.
But the debtor's status as a government means it is also in the
interests of creditors as a whole to collectivize their efforts; govern-
ments do not hold many assets abroad available for attachment by
creditors, and there is not likely to be a liquidation judgment against a
39 Blending psychological and economic theories to examine the fresh start policy, see
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1985)
[hereinafter Jackson, Fresh Start].
40 The Congressional assumption in passing Chapter 11 was that "The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap... It is more economically
efficient to reorganize than liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets." H.R.REP.NO. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
41 See THorAs H. JACKsON, Tam LOGIC AND LImrs OF BAN.Ru'rcy LAW (1986); Douglas
G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Lucian
A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988);
Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ.
1043; Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11: A Re-
view of the Evidence, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131 (1993).
42 Which is not to say, as has frequently been unhappily illustrated, that governments cannot.
43 See Tabb, supra note 34.
44 Domestic bankrnptcy experience can raise policy issues in sovereign debt. Chapter 11 has
been criticized for not giving adequate control to creditors to bring genuine reorganization to
reluctant debtors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANK. L.. 247. This naturally clarifies thinking
policy of the desirable power balance between sovereign debtors and their creditors - one of
the major criticisms of the international sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s was that the creditors
exercised too much power over the debtors, to the point that economic reorganization had only
the purpose of precipitating interest payments.
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sovereign debtor at home. In the absence of official lending, the only
realistic solution for creditors is to negotiate.
The necessity of debt restructuring as part of a sovereign debt
work-out mechanism brings us back to the creditors' dilemma. The
more inevitable it is that creditors must take a loss, the more carefully
we must anticipate competitive behavior among them. A fundamen-
tal goal of designing a system will be to prevent individual creditors
from disrupting proceedings or free riding on other creditors'
settlements.
Although there is a lack of ideas for enabling sovereign work-outs...
World leaders chose to anticipate government liquidity crises by
leaping to an expensive public solution - increasing money available
to the IMF. This may seem surprising given the political climate in
most of the world's richer nations - impatience with government ex-
penditure and a preference for the natural flow of the market over
public control. Actually, it reflected a bankruptcy of ideas: only now
are proposals emerging for a workable solution which does not in-
volve huge government spending. What we need today is a system
for the market to bear the costs of bad investments instead of the
governments of the world shouldering that loss.
Until now, shifting the cost of a sovereign debt crisis to the mar-
ket has mostly been suggested by politicians who can make political
capital by characterizing investors as free riders. The strongest objec-
tors to United States policy in the Mexican crisis claimed that inves-
tors were being bailed out from their losses.46 Little attempt has been
made to provide a mechanism by which market investors would take
their share of the cost of a bad investment.
... Jeffrey Sachs has suggested a way for the markets to absorb the
losses..
One suggestion has come from the Harvard economist Jeffrey
Sachs. He has suggested that governments set up a sort of interna-
tional bankruptcy regime for debtor governments.47 Such a system
would give the IMF legal powers analogous to a bankruptcy judge in
Chapter 11 proceedings. The IMF would have the legal authority to
45 Rory Macmillan, New Lease of Life for Bondholder Councils, FiN. TiMES, Aug. 15, 1995,
at 11 [hereinafter, Macmillan, Bondholder Councils]; Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes
with Francesca Comelli, Leonardo Felli, Julian Franks, Christopher Greenwood and Hugh Mer-
cer, Crisis, What Crisis?, Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors Council for Economic Policy
Research, Sept. 1995 [hereinafter, Eichengreen and Portes, Crisis, What Crisis?].
46 Pat Buchanan, Mexico: Who Was Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1995, at A27.
47 Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort? (unpublished manu-
script, 1995. On file with author).
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declare a moratorium upon debt payments, stop legal proceedings and
organize debt work-outs.48 This would reapportion losses to the mar-
ket, providing a less expensive solution for governments. All three
problems of leadership, coordination and solidarity would be solved
and imposed by the IMF. 4 9
.. . but his international bankruptcy system turns to the international
institutions...
Sach's solution looks to the international institutions as the an-
swer. The profile of organizations such as the IMF and the World
Bank makes them apparently the obvious place to begin. Their in-
creasing role as development institutions, the IMF's part in the 1980s
debt crisis and the 50th year anniversary of the Bretton Woods system
have made them the focus of the debate about sovereign debt
problems. The IMF's desire to play a world leadership role5" was il-
lustrated by its commitment to the Mexican crisis in 1995 when it ap-
plied several times Mexico's allotted share in an unrepeatable
rescue.51 Likewise, because the most developed analogy for debt
work-outs is the U.S. Chapter 11 judicial proceeding, it also seems
natural to think of a system with the IMF in the role of something
analogous to the bankruptcy judge. However, for reasons I will ex-
48 There are earlier examples of this idea. See Benjamin J. Cohen, A Global Chapter 11, 75
FoRnirN POL'Y 109 (1989); Christopher G. Oechsli Note, Procedural Guidelines for Renegoti-
ating LDC Debt An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L
L. 305 (1981); Stephen Bainbridge, Comity and Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Anal-
ogy, 10 MD. . INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1986); Ruben Sklar, Note, Renegotiation of External Debt:
The Allied Bank Cases and the Chapter 11 Analogy, 17 U. MLAMi INTER-AM. L. REV. 59 (1984).
49 It has been suggested th'It arbitration might be appropriate as a dispute forum for sover-
eign debt. In the middle of the 1980s debt crisis, it was thrown out as a possible solution that an
international arbitration tribunal could be created which would have the power to enforce Chap-
ter 11 principles. Note, Renegotiation of External Debt: The Allied Bank Case and the Chapter 11
Analogy, 17 U. MAI ITErm-AM. L. RE,. 59, 77-86 (1985). The problem with this suggestion
was that it was over-ambitious. Using arbitral mechanisms would have involved creating a new
international institution, choosing bankruptcy policies to guide the arbitrators, choosing arbitra-
tors, and having all contracts contain arbitration clauses. The highly politicized nature of any
such arbitration would have made agreement on all these aspects impossible to achieve.
50 Zanny Minton-Beddoes, who writes for The Economist, has suggested that the IMF over-
reached its capacity, not because of the U.S. influence on IMF policies, but because of its desire
for relevance in the world economy. Zanny Minton-Beddoes, Why the IMF Needs Reform, FOR-
EIGN AiF., May 1995, at 123. See also, Robert Chote, Weaknesses in IMF Shown by Mexico, FiN.
Trams, Apr. 25, 1995.
51 The IMF's contribution far exceeded the amount that would normally be available to
Mexico under IMF rules. George Graham, $50bn Mexico Aid Plan 'Averted a Global Crisis.
'Exceptional' Support Was Required, Says IMF Chief, FiN. TrMEs, Feb. 3,1995, at 16. The IMF's
contribution to support Mexican debt repayments has been estimated at almost a fifth of the
IMF's liquid resources and seven times Mexico's quota. Prospective on a Panic, FJN. TimEs, Feb
11, 1995, at 8.
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plain below, the IMF's role should be restricted to providing tempo-
rary liquidity and the conditionality of its adjustment programs.
S.. and would impinge upon national sovereignty.
Equipping the IMF with such legal powers would threaten the
sovereignty of emerging market countries by giving the IMF the
power to decide when a country could declare a moratorium on its
debt. It would place a large amount of control in the hands of an
institution which has often been the subject of criticism for its policies
towards emerging market countries. It might also influence the terms
of a debt rescheduling. A debt crisis is a highly political event. The
1980s showed the extensive impact it can have on a country's socio-
economic development, growth and stability. Until the world ad-
vances significantly beyond the location of political power in the na-
tion state, a country's leaders should be able to negotiate with its
creditors without depending entirely on intervention from the IMF.
This is made worse by the perceived partiality of the IMF...
Although it profoundly affects the international financial order
and domestic economy, a debt crisis is simply a breakdown in contrac-
tual relations between two parties, a debtor and its creditors. The
debtor is having difficulty meeting its obligations. The enormous body
of creditors are usually predominantly located in rich countries.
These countries have the voting power to control the IMF. Vesting
such power in an institution which is controlled by the governments of
the creditors would produce an unbalanced system.
... and might weaken international financial law...
Giving the IMF such legal powers would also revolutionize inter-
national financial law. Debt instruments governed by New York law
or English law would be subject to the uncertainties of the interna-
tional political order. These laws and legal systems are chosen for
their sophistication and predictability. The IMF, an agent of its mem-
ber governments, may be subject to unpredictable political influence.
In the ever changing international order, it does not make sense to
subject international financial relationships to the decision of an inter-
national institution. The real value of official intervention is in the
provision of some emergency funding and some discipline in the coun-
try's economic policies.
... besides which, a work-out manager is unnecessary.
Apart from being politically unacceptable, a sovereign debt work-
out manager is unnecessary. At the other end of the spectrum from
Jeffrey Sachs, James Hurlock, a lawyer at White & Case, has argued
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that the problems of leadership and coordination are not significant. 52
Corporate debt work-outs are largely "self-executing in that creditors,
in concert with the debtor, collectively determine the economic terms
upon which the enterprise will be restructured. '53 Bankruptcy judges
actually play a peripheral role in corporate debt restructurings be-
cause the real action is in the negotiations. A debt work-out system
does not necessarily require any international government organiza-
tion to play a central role because the difficulties consist of fundamen-
tally mechanical problems which do not need government supervision.
Debtors and creditors can reach restructuring agreements successfully
without official intervention.
James Hurlock suggests giving governments legal immunity...
The real problem, he argues, is solidarity - the danger of the
maverick bondholder disrupting the negotiations by taking its cause to
a court. Hurlock suggests that this could be stopped by closing the
courts to such investors. The sovereign immunity laws permit law
suits in the U.S. and U.K. against foreign states. These should be
amended so that a sovereign debtor would be immune from law suits
in the midst of a negotiated work-out. Immunity would apply if the
negotiations were being conducted in good faith by, or had been ac-
cepted by, a super-majority of creditors. This would protect the
debtor and compel bondholders to join the collective process.
.. but this also has drawbacks.
An ingenious answer, this has two problems. First, Hurlock un-
derestimates the problems of leadership and coordination. As I ex-
plained in Chapter II, the next sovereign debt crisis will be far more
complicated than the banking debt crisis.54 Second, using sovereignimmunity laws may herald a return to the 19th century when Latin
American governments defaulted on their debts in the knowledge that
the creditors had no legal remedies. This problem is usually called the
"moral hazard." I will explore Hurlock's suggestion further in Chap-
ter V.
The ideal system would avoid all of these problems...
An ideal system to handle sovereign debt crises would avoid the
politico-economic problems outlined above. It would take advantage
of the market by efficiently allocating the cost of risk and loss. It
would not be an expensive official mechanism whereby public funds
52 James Hurlock, The Way Ahead for Sovereign Debt, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1995, at 78 [here-
inafter, Hurlock, The Way Ahead].
53 Id. at 79.
54 See also, Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, supra note 30.
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bear the cost of investors' losses. Rather, it would make investors
bear the cost of debt adjustments themselves. It would not intrude
unnecessarily upon the sovereignty of emerging market countries but
would allow market negotiations directly between the parties. Lastly,
it would avoid the moral hazard of countries defaulting irresponsibly
on their debts.
. .. and Eichengreen and Portes have made suggestions in the right
direction.
A recent paper by the Centre for Economic Policy Research
takes such an approach to sovereign debt work-outs. Barry Eichen-
green and Richard Portes suggest what appears to be a three pronged
work-out system.55 First, addressing the problem of coordination,
they endorse the idea of creating one or more bondholder councils
which, with the help of a mediation or conciliation service, would ne-
gotiate debt restructurings on behalf of bondholders. Second, they
suggest that the lack of solidarity could be solved by an ex ante solu-
tion: if the legal provisions of future bonds allowed a majority of
bondholders to negotiate changes to the essential terms of the bonds
(maturity date, coupon payment date, principal and interest amounts,
etc.) then bondholder councils could negotiate effectively with the
sovereign debtor. To make this fair for dissenting minority creditors,
they suggest that such creditors should have access to an arbitration
tribunal if they do not like the solution negotiated by the majority
bondholders. The third prong of their approach endorses the increase
in the IMF's ability to provide emergency financing and encourages it
to play a legitimizing role for a country which wishes to renegotiate its
debts. Coupled with stronger conditionality, countries which are
afraid to default because of the effect on their reputations would be
enabled to do so with the approval of the IMF. The "Agenda for Re-
form" presented by Eichengreen and Portes contains some useful
ideas, though none of them are fully worked out as yet. I will explore
some of these issues in Chapter V.
IV. TH HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The structure of sovereign debt in emerging markets has been
transformed in the last five years. As a result of the Brady Initiative
and numerous new issues, bond finance, largely dormant for more
than half a century, has become the dominant means of external bor-
rowing. Because some of the problems to be faced in a sovereign debt
55 Eichengreen and Portes, Crisis? What Crisis?, supra note 45.
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work-out today resemble those encountered in early Latin American
sovereign bond defaults, a brief review of the history may illuminate
our search for solutions.
The United Kingdom has seen sovereign bond defaults before...
19th century Latin America saw a sweep of sovereign debt cri-
ses.16 An enormous volume of loans to Latin American states in the
early 1820s from British investors57 was followed by mass defaults
throughout the middle of the 19th century.5 8 Creditors had no en-
forceable legal rights at that time: the doctrine of sovereign immunity
stopped British courts from giving judgments against foreign govern-
ments. Local Latin American courts would not entertain suits against
their states.5 9 Without a judicial remedy, bondholders developed pro-
cedures by which they negotiated payment of some of the defaulted
debt.
The defaults began with the "first Latin American debt crisis" in
1826. Reschedulings occurred over and over again. Often the Latin
American states were denied access to credit - which proved to be
the creditors' most powerful weapon - until the 1870s. In May
182860 the comprehensiveness of the Latin American defaults brought
about a general bondholders' meeting at the City of London Tavern
where it was proposed "that a committee be formed to apply to the
[British] government for assistance, and request that it urge the
consuls recently appointed to Latin America at great public expense
to press the claimants' cause with the defaulting nations more
energetically. 6
1
56 See FRANK DAWSON, TiE FIRsT LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRisis 197 (1990); see also SEC
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INvEsGATION OF THE WORK, Acrnvrrns, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMxrrEES, Pt. V, 120-142 (1937) [herein-
after, SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITEES REPORT].
57 See generally HERBERT FEis, EUROPE: THE WORLD's BANKER (1932) (discussing Euro-
pean foreign investment before WorId War I) [RCC]; LELAND HAMILTON JENKS, THE MIGRA-
TION OF BxrnsH CAPITAL TO 1875 (1927).
58 See generally DAWSON, supra note 56, cbs VI-X.
59 The United States also pursued a similar doctrine of sovereign immunity. See generally
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116,135-46 (1812) (without a waiver, sovereign immu-
nity is a defense). Professor Borchard concluded as late as 1951 that "as a general principle it is
not possible to sue a foreign state on its public bonds." EDwIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVEN-
cms & FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS, Vo1. 1, 166 (1952). The Tate Letter in 1952 changed the policy
to a more restricted doctrine of sovereign immunity, denying immunity for a sovereign's com-
mercial activities. Jack Tate, Letter from the Acting Legal Adviser to the Attorney General
(May 25, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
60 Before 1828, "bondholder meetings had been confined to creditors of a particular coun-
try." DAWSON, supra note 56, at 164.
61 DAWSON, supra note 56, at 164.
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During the 1830s, a Spanish-American Bondholders Committee
was formed as an umbrella organization uniting various bondholder
committees which pressured defaulting states in the press, lobbied
parliament and persuaded the securities exchanges to deny the de-
faulting states access to credit by further bond issues.62 A flood of
defaults by a number of non-Latin American states produced the first
single centralized institution: the Council of Foreign Bondholders in
London in November 1868. The Council lobbied parliament for sup-
port and negotiated rescheduling agreements with the debtor states. 63
The major benefit to bondholders was to give them a unified or-
ganization to represent them without a conflict of interests. Without a
bondholder's organization, the only institutions to act on their behalf
were the banks which had underwritten the bonds. These issuing
houses had divided loyalties to bondholders and debtors.' 4
The Council was composed of bondholders, members of loan-
contracting houses and of the stock exchange. During its first three
years the Council was funded by subscriptions from bondholders, but
in 1873 it was incorporated as a company existing not for profit or
trade but a public object.65
Its effectiveness was in the strength of community it provided be-
tween the bankers, the stock exchange and the bondholders.
Although the stock exchange had refused access to credit for default-
ing governments in the past,66 the concerted action was even more
effective to refuse listings of new issues.6 7 Thus in 1874 the Council of
Foreign Bondholders persuaded the London and the European stock
62 DAWSON, supra note 56, at 195.
63 It also became involved in "supervising customs collections, managing banks and rail-
roads, and overseeing other economic sectors of debtor states." DAWSON, supra note 56, at 195.
64 The committee appointed to set up the Council commented that "contractors have found
themselves in an embarrassing situation towards the [debtor] Government and Bondholders,
being under certain obligations to both. On such occasions the Council will be ready to act as
mediator between the [debtor] Foreign Government and the Bondholders, relieving thereby the
contractor from his unpleasant and sometimes equivocal position." Quoted in BORCHARD,
supra note 59, at 204.
65 Under s23 of the Companies Act 1867; see BORCHARD, supra note 59, at 205.
66 Spain, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Austria and Turkey are examples: see FEIS, EUROPE THE
WORLD'S BANKER, supra note 57, at 115; and BORCHARD, supra note 59, at 174; "One of the
rules of the Exchange, adopted in 1825, was to refuse quotation to new loans to governments
who were in default on existing obligations and who had refused to negotiate in good faith with
their creditors, and in extreme instances to strike from the list all loans of the offending govern-
ment." Eichengreen and Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, Readjustment in EICHEN-
GREEN and LINDERT, Tim INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 15
(1990).
67 The Stock Exchange relied on the Council for information on the status of readjustment
negotiations the relationship between the two institutions.
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exchanges to block new Mexican issues while Mexico defaulted on its
debts during civil war.68 Turkey's loan of 1877 was denied listing for
five years at the request of the bondholders until previous unpaid
bonds were settled.69
The increasing availability of French and German capital towards
the end of the century weakened this form of pressure. The Paris
stock exchange, which "took up the bulk of the new loans floated after
1881,' '7° and'the Berlin71 stock exchange were subject to government
policies of capitalization, particularly in Germany where nationalist
colonial ambitions pushed foreign investment.72
... and so has the United States.
Foreign governments began to issue large amounts of bonds in
the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. Again, enor-
mous defaults occurred, particularly during the 1930s. American cred-
itors used the same methods as had the European bondholders.73
Protective committees were organized by entrepreneurial bankers and
bondholders. These committees offered to negotiate on behalf of
bondholders. They required that bondholders deposit their bonds
with them, giving them wide discretion in negotiations.74 Their nego-
tiating authority depended on the amount of bonds entrusted to them:
if they held more, their representative position was stronger.75 A
number of competing protective committees arose.76 The committees
68 DAWSON, supra note 56, at 197.
69 BORCHARD, supra note 59, at 174. This method was not always successful: the outcry in
1871 of holders of defaulted Mexican bonds at the issue of a loan secured by an assignment of
the Mexican Republic was ignored and the stock exchange did not refuse a quotation to the loan.
WYNNE, STATE INSOLVENCIES AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS VoL- 2, at 34 (1995); a similar re-
sult obtained in 1874.
70 Albert Fishlow, Lessons from the past" capital markets during the 19th century and the
interwar period, in MiLEs KAn.ER, THm PoUTIcs OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT, 67.
71 For example, when London bankers were skeptical of the creditworthiness of the Mexican
government which sought a loan in 1888, Berlin proved much more open: see WYNNE, supra note
69, at 47.
72 FEIS, supra note 57, at 115.
73 See generally BORCHARD, supra note 59 (discussing European bondholder remedies).
74 Conflicts of interest persisted: the unfettered discretion could be abused by members of
the protective committees. Some were more interested in profit than in obtaining a favorable
result for bondholders. SEC PR TEcrrvE AND REORGANIZATION COMMrIrrEEs REPORT, supra
note 56, at 120-142.
75 These committees had to develop the confidence and authority of the bondholders and
then establish their negotiating authority with the foreign government. SEC PROTEcIvE AND
REORGANIZATON CoMMrrmEs REPORT, supra note 56, at 212. "Control over deposited bonds
and possession of proxies are obviously evidence of authority." SEC PRoTEcrivE AND REOR-
GANIZATION Com mra REPORT, supra note 56, at 220.
76 SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION ComMrrEEs REPORT, supra note 56, at 271,
376.
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negotiated with the foreign government to persuade it to resume pay-
ments. The bondholders who had deposited their bonds with the com-
mittees were bound by the settlements they reached.
After the 1929-1931 crash, the Foreign Bondholders Protective
Council was organized to represent bondholder interests.77 The
Council did not actually hold bonds: its negotiating authority derived
from its quasi-official status as a statutorily created institution. Bond-
holders were not bound by the results of negotiations. The Council
recommended the settlements to them78 and the bondholders then
chose whether to accept or reject the settlement. However, the alter-
native was usually to receive no debt service payments, so bondhold-
ers usually submitted to the Council's recommendation, much like the
banks submitting to the Bank Advisory Committees in the 1980s.
However, because the Council was a quasi-official institution, it could
not represent bondholders with complete independence. Because the
bondholders' negotiating leverage was limited to political pressure im-
posed on the sovereign debtor by the bondholders' government, they
were dependent upon U.S. government help and therefore influenced
by its policies.7 9
Sometimes bondholders pursued their remedies through the issu-
ing banks, which either funded a protective committee or acted di-
rectly for the bondholders. As underwriters of the bonds, they had a
relationship with the debtor and the ability to contact bondholders.8"
But the issuing banks had the same conflict of interests experienced in
the United Kingdom the previous century. They remained firmly
loyal agents of the issuer.8'
We could use the historical models to organize bondholders today...
The historical bondholder councils have been criticized because
they were never very successful at securing payment on the bonds.
77 SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES REPORT, supra note 56, at 62-83.
BORCHARD, supra note 59, at 193. The SEC compared the different committees and preferred
representation by the FBPC to the private ad hoe committees because it avoided the conflicts of
interest of the ad hoc committees. SEC PROTECrIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMIrrrEEs RE-
PORT, supra note 56, at 618, 738.
78 SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES REPORT, supra note 56, at 214,
366-67.
79 SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES REPORT, supra note 56, at 389.
"[I]f the State Department was unsympathetic to negotiations at a particular time, the Council
would not go ahead with them ." SEC PRoTEc-rrvE AND REORGANIZATION CoMMrrrEEs RE-
PORT, supra note 56, at 391 (footnote omitted).
80 SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES REPORT, supra note 56, at 507.
81 SEC PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMrTEES REPORT, supra note 56, at 512-
531.
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The lack of legal redress in the courts gave them very little power, and
they were mostly dependent on their own governments to apply polit-
ical pressure on the debtor. However, we can draw two conclusions
from this history which help resolve the mechanical problems outlined
in Chapter II. First, bondholders and their governments have organ-
ized representative institutions before to negotiate with sovereign
debtors. The problem of leadership has been dealt with before and
could be solved again by using similar institutions. Bondholder coun-
cils took the lead with bondholders and produced collective represen-
tation. They thus also solved the problem of coordination by
communicating with bondholders and negotiating reschedulings which
they accepted. Bondholder Councils would be more complex today
because of the speed at which bonds are now traded. The changing
identities, location and sectoral variety of bondholders complicates
representation. Moreover, such institutions need to bring a larger
number and wider variety of bondholders together. In the second
part of the next chapter, I will explore how they could be structured.
... and make them successful by developing bondholder solidarity.
Secondly, bondholders acted together through committees and
councils because it was their best option - they had no alternative.
Their best result was produced by acting together because together
they enjoyed more weight in negotiations. Thus the "collectivization
goal" inherent in a work-out scenario resulted from a solidarity of
creditors' interests which was produced by necessity. In this way, the
third problem explained in Chapter II never arose. Today, there is a
lack of creditor solidarity because bondholders may benefit from act-
ing alone or simply not acting together at all. However, it may be
possible to induce creditors to act together if it is made their best op-
tion. In the third part of the next chapter, I will explore ways to make
collective action the best option for creditors.
V. BLUEPRINT FOR A SOVEREIGN DEBT WoRK-our SYSTEM
In Chapter II, I explained the mechanical problems created by
the size and complexity of the creditor body in today's legal and insti-
tutional framework. Collective representation is now so difficult to
achieve that debt restructurings are virtually impossible. In the third
chapter, I argued that current suggestions for handling debt crises en-
counter economic or political problems - they are expensive non-
market solutions, they violate the national sovereignty of debtor na-
tions or reintroduce the moral hazards of the 19th century. I gave an
overview in Chapter IV of the bondholder councils of the 19th and
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early 20th centuries and suggested that we could learn how to solve
today's problems from historical experience. In this chapter, I suggest
that reforming the Trustee Indenture Act of 1939 to provide an In-
denture Trustee for sovereign bondholders would help to fill the lead-
ership vacuum, at least in the United States. Similar legislation could
be implemented in other countries to make this solution effective
globally. I propose reviving and remodeling bondholder councils in
order to provide coordination of bondholders in negotiations. I then
consider ways to engineer solidarity to produce collective decisions.
The mechanisms I propose would avoid the problems I discussed in
Chapter III: they would not distort the market pricing of risk, would
cost governments very little, do not resort to the vagaries of interna-
tional public sector control and avoid the moral hazard.
A. Leadership - Indenture Trustees for Sovereign Debt
Fiscal Agents should be more like Indenture Trustees...
Simple legislation could provide for leadership. In the United
States, reform of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 so that some provi-
sions applied to debt issues by foreign governments would contribute
order to the chaos of a sovereign bond default. This should be done
cautiously, however. The Securities and Exchange Commission is
considering repealing the 1939 Act because many of its provisions are
now obsolete as a result of changes in market practice. But if the
Fiscal Agent had some of the responsibilities of the Indenture Trustee,
it would act immediately on behalf of the bondholders. It would com-
municate with them, enter discussions with the debtor and even nego-
tiate restructurings which it would then recommend to bondholders.
It is not clear why issues of debt by foreign governments were
excluded from the scope of the 1939 Act in the first place. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission report which gave rise to the Act did
not address whether the proposed corporate bond Indenture Trustee
would be similarly appropriate for foreign government bonds. s2 Like-
wise the reports of the Senate Committees passing the legislation said
nothing more than that "substantially different considerations apply to
[foreign government bond] issues. 83 Perhaps now is the time to re-
consider whether this is really so. It seems that political considera-
82 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION
OF THE WORK, AcnvrrEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZA-
TION COMMITTEES, PART VI, TRUSTEES UNDER INDENTURES (June 18, 1936) (hereafter SEC
TRUSTEE REPORT).
83 SENATE COMMrrrEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939: RE-
PORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 2065, S. Rep. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1939) at 16; SENATE
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tions in subjecting foreign governments to the extensive requirements
of the securities laws played a part. Indeed, financially mature coun-
tries might still resent the imposition of such legislation on their debt
issues (though most wealthy countries issue their debt on the domestic
markets). But an emerging market sovereign debtor should welcome
the existence of an Indenture Trustee because it would ease debt re-
structuring. Moreover, the absence of a bankruptcy regime for sover-
eign debt suggests that an Indenture Trustee is even more appropriate
for sovereign debt than for corporate debt.
To the extent that it is appropriate, similar legislative reforms in
other major capital centers would be a move toward a global solution.
Most sovereign bonds are issued under New York or English law, so
just changing the 1939 Act and the equivalent English legislative re-
gime would provide significant leadership in a sovereign bond crisis.
... but we still need a mechanism for organizing bondholders.
This may not, however, be sufficient to organize and coordinate
bondholders to the point where a debt restructuring is possible. First,
leadership does not guarantee a following - obtaining the consent of
every bondholder would still be necessary. Second, a debtor may
have a number of issues of bonds on the market, each with a different
Fiscal Agent. Even if these Fiscal Agents had the responsibilities of
Indenture Trustees, they themselves would need coordination. Some
might find that serving the interests of their bondholders required un-
cooperative behavior, perhaps bargaining to take a smaller cut of the
restructuring losses.
Lastly, even if Fiscal Agents were coordinated to act together,
significant involvement is necessary from bondholders. Without an ef-
fective bankruptcy regime, bondholders would rely heavily on the Fis-
cal Agent to negotiate for them. Bondholders usually become
involved in negotiations themselves or through representatives-In-
denture trustees are not necessarily expected to perform this role.
Historically, even when the agent took an active part, it often sug-
gested that the bondholders form a committee.84 Fiscal agents are not
COMMITrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Trust Indenture Bill of 1939: REPORT
TO ACCOMPANY S. 2065, S. Rep. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) at 42.
84 when the State of Maranhao, Brazil, defaulted on its bonds, Bankers Trust Company, the
Trustee, more like today's Fiscal Agent than today's Indenture Trustee, wrote to bondholders
saying, "We, as Trustee feel that the interest of the bondholders are being affected so vitally by
present developments in Brazil, that the bondholders should be apprised of such developments
as have come to our attention. We also believe that they should be advised of the necessity of
organizing a committee to collaborate with the Trustee for the protection of their interests. It is
also felt that in the course of his dealings with the Brazilian authorities, our representatives will
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actually creditors, and although they may become obligated to act as if
they were the creditors themselves, there is no substitute for creditors
directly appointing their own representatives. Indeed, usually in cor-
porate bankruptcies, the leadership role is taken up by bondholders
who hold significant amounts of debt. The reason this will not happen
now-and did not happen in the Mexican crisis-is that the expecta-
tions, assumptions and even hopes of the investment community are
such that the bondholders do not anticipate being actively involved in
a sovereign work-out. For these reasons, some coordination mecha-
nism is needed to enable bondholders to produce collective represen-
tation, as well as to alter their expectations so that they recognize that
investors have a role in a debt crisis.
B. Coordination - Bondholder Councils
An effective work-out system must be able to draw bondholders
together to renegotiate foreign government debt. In the 19th and
early 20th centuries, bondholder councils performed this role. If re-
vived and redesigned for our age, they could provide a market solu-
tion to debt crises.85
(1) Scope of a Creditors Council?
Should one council cover all external debt?
A preliminary question in setting up a representation mechanism
for bondholders is whether there should be one international creditor
council which represents all of a country's creditors, including bond-
holders, bank creditors (including trade debt) and perhaps even multi-
lateral institutions and governments. The "collectivization goal"
would suggest incorporating all of a country's creditors in one negoti-
ating organization, an international work-out council. However, the
organizational cost of bringing together the holders of different types
of debt might be too unwieldy. Indeed, the existence and successful
history of the Paris Club for official creditors and the London Club for
commercial bank creditors suggests that these gatherings should con-
tinue in the same roles. Cooperation between them could be ex-
tended to the bondholder councils.
be greatly aided if the opinion of the bondholders can be obtained on questions affecting their
interests." SEC TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 159.
85 See Macmillan, Bondholder Councils, supra note 45.
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(2) International Council or National Councils?
Should there be one international bondholder council...
A second issue is whether bondholders should be organized by
one international bondholder council or a number of national bond-
holder councils. In the former case, repayment and rescheduling of all
of the bonds of a debtor government would be negotiated by the sin-
gle "International Bondholders Council." Bondholders all over the
world would be represented by that institution.
The international location of bondholders and the international
transferability of bonds argue for an international organization which
would sit naturally beside the London Club and the Paris Club, per-
haps as a New York Club. All of a country's foreign creditors -
bondholders, banks and governments - would be neatly represented
by a trinity of organizations. However, whereas banks and govern-
ments are relatively easy to coordinate, bondholders might find a sin-
gle international organization too far removed from them, unable to
coordinate them fairly and competently. The fact that certain banks
and governments are permanent players in sovereign debt lending
provides natural leadership in the London and Paris Clubs. But be-
cause most investors in sovereign debt do not play a key role in the
general business of issuing the debt, leadership would be difficult to
achieve in an international organization. Moreover, the difficulties of
international legal cooperation and a natural reluctance to create an-
other international organization suggest that it would be better to set
up a number of national councils in some key jurisdictions.
... or several national bondholder councils?
Rather than choosing a supranational or intergovernmental solu-
tion, national councils might be charged with representing the inter-
ests of bondholders. But which council would represent which
bondholders? Bonds are issued in different countries, in different cur-
rencies, under different laws to bondholders who have different na-
tionalities. One of two factors could determine the nationality of a
bondholder council. First, the location of creditors: U.S. creditors
might be represented by a U.S. institution and German creditors by a
German institution. However, this would produce an uncoordinated
multitude of councils in every country which has creditors, which is
evidently undesirable. Second, the law and jurisdiction governing the
documents: the bondholder council in the chosen jurisdiction is prob-
ably the most appropriate for any investor holding those bonds.
Rather than decisions about the legal relations being resolved by a
court, the council would negotiate them. The council would be effec-
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tively operating in place of the courts of the jurisdiction specified in
the bond agreements. Holders of a bond whose documentation speci-
fied that any disputes must be decided in an English court according
to English law would have a choice of suing in England or going
through the bondholder council. For this reason, it would be sensible
for the legal jurisdiction of the bonds (rather than the locality of bond-
holders) to determine which bondholder council is appropriate for
holders of those bonds. Holders of foreign government bonds issued
under New York law and submitting to the New York courts would be
represented by a resurrected Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
in New York. Holders of bonds issued under English law would go to
a resurrected Council of Foreign Bondholders in London. Because
the vast majority of bond offerings still submit to English and New
York courts and law, only a small number of councils would need to
be set up.
(3) Structuring a Bondholder Council
A bondholder council should be a representative organization...
The historical councils were representative organizations. They
negotiated with the debtor on behalf of the bondholders to obtain
payments and reschedulings of their bonds. The same model could be
used today to organize bondholders, provide representational unity
and enable negotiations where they are currently impossible. Much as
the Bank Advisory Committees of the 1980s provided a representa-
tional role in the debt restructurings, the councils would take the
bondholders' place at the negotiating table.
Simply having an institution to communicate with bondholders,
coordinate collective action and provide a resource for advice and
help, would provide some organization presently lacking. But the
goal of creating bondholder councils should be more ambitious than
enabling communication and providing information. The aim should
be to produce a negotiated restructuring in a debt crisis.
... but its structure depends on two questions...
Two issues enable us to analyze the structure that bondholder
councils should take if they are to achieve this goal. First, who would
appoint representatives to negotiate with the debtor: governments,
bondholders or some combination? Second, what legal mandate
would the representatives enjoy: would they have the power to nego-
tiate agreements binding on the bondholders, or merely recommenda-
tions which bondholders could accept or reject?
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These two questions are interrelated. The greater the level of
government involvement in appointing representatives, the weaker
the legitimacy of the councils in representing creditors' interests. On
the other hand, if the councils directly represent bondholders, they
might justifiably be given a greater legal mandate to bind the bond-
holders to a rescheduling agreement.
•. which could produce two different models of organization.
A bondholder council might be set up on one of the two broad
models outlined below. The first envisions a council much like the
historical councils, a quasi-official agency without a direct representa-
tive mandate or binding power but with enough influence over bond-
holders to produce some sort of debt rescheduling. The second model
outlines an institution which enables bondholders to appoint their
own representatives who would then negotiate with the debtor, having
the legal power to bind the bondholders.
One would be a quasi-official permanent representative...
A bondholder council might be a permanent quasi-official institu-
tion whose staff are appointed by or with the consent of the national
government or members of the financial community. Decisions would
be made quickly without the need to consult large numbers of bond-
holders and require them to elect representatives. This is particularly
crucial in a crisis situation where the market will lose confidence in a
slow and unclear process. It could employ financial and legal experts
to act as a permanent body of negotiators, but the sporadic nature of
debt crises suggests that it may be more appropriate to employ a mini-
mal staff and engage experts (law firms, finance firms, economists,
etc.) on an ad hoc basis at the onset of a crisis.
... having significant political power.
As long as the national government had influence over the choice
of officers, a council would enjoy some derivative political weight
from the government. This might be advantageous because of the rel-
atively strong position sovereign debtors enjoy compared with individ-
ual bondholders. It might equalize the power distribution in the
negotiations. Such a bondholder council (whether an international or-
ganization or a national council) could be an important political body,
wielding much power in the international financial markets. Its pro-
nouncements would be carefully monitored by the media and market
analysts. It could influence the economic policies of countries before
and during a debt crisis. A world player, it would resemble the histor-
ical councils which had a significant influence over events in countries
such as Egypt, Thrkey and Hungary at the end of the 19th century.
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It would negotiate with the debtor...
The council would communicate with all of the investors holding
bonds of the debtor. It would inform them of the debtor's financial
difficulties and its intention to negotiate with the debtor. Its staff
would negotiate with the foreign government. It would then an-
nounce the outcome of the negotiations to bondholders. If bondhold-
ers agreed to the negotiated terms, bonds would be changed pursuant
to the debt rescheduling or other arrangement agreed to by the coun-
cil and the debtor. The council might be given the power to take some
initiatives on behalf of the bondholders, such as bringing legal actions
or commencing negotiations. It might be granted the authority to
take such action unilaterally without having to consult with the
bondholders.
.. but only with the power to recommend outcomes to bondholders,
not to bind them.
However, the influence of the national government over the
council's policies would weaken its representational legitimacy. The
interests of the American government, for example, are not necessar-
ily the same as those of Wall Street investors. It would be difficult to
providd such an organization with anything more than the power to
recommend outcomes to bondholders because it would lack the legiti-
macy of a directly elected representative. It would be acting in much
the same way as did the Bank Advisory Committees during the 1980s
and the historical councils, producing non-binding recommendations
for the bondholders. Without the ability to bind bondholders, the
council would lack an important power. As I explained in Chapter IT,
bondholders will not be susceptible to pressure to agree, let alone ac-
cept a mere recommendation from a council. Although some of the
methods of producing bondholder solidarity may result in bondhold-
ers submitting to recommendations, perhaps solving the legitimacy
problem so as to enable the council to bind bondholders would be
better. This requires a closer connection between the bondholders
and their representatives.
Alternatively, the council would help them appoint their own
representatives..
A council could simply facilitate unified bondholder action.
Under this model, the council would not be the representative organi-
zation itself, but would enable bondholders to appoint representa-
tives. It would contact the holders of each series of bonds
outstanding, organize bondholder meetings and guide them through
procedures to appoint representatives. It would provide logistical and
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information support to the representatives in negotiations. Once a ne-
gotiated settlement was reached, the council would convey the terms
to bondholders. Because the council would enable bondholders to ap-
point representatives rather than serve as the representative itself, it,
would not have the same politically derived power as a permanent
representative institution described above. But as elected representa-
tives, the negotiators would have greater legitimacy and would per-
haps be able to bind bondholders to its settlements, enabling
reschedulings to occur more easily. In this way it would resemble the
historical private bondholder committees which asked bondholders to
deposit their bonds with the committee and grant it the power to
reach legally binding agreements with the debtor on their behalf. It
would also be more like a corporate debt work-out whose rules essen-
tially allow the parties to appoint negotiators with minimal official
intervention.
... having rules governing their election to a negotiating committee.
The council might have a set of rules ("Council Rules") which
govern the appointment of representatives and require communica-
tions between them and bondholders. It would oversee and facilitate
the appointment process. The Council Rules might provide that each
series of bonds outstanding has the right to appoint one representative
by 'a majority of the attendees at a bondholders meeting. The Rules
would provide that the elected representatives form a "Bondholders
Negotiating Committee." The Rules would perhaps limit the number
of representatives on the Committee to about ten, and provide for
consolidation of Committee members if this produced an un-
manageably large number of representatives. The Rules would set
out procedures for Committee decisions and its legal authority to
change the terms of the bonds submitted to it. The Rules might pro-
vide that the representative of the largest aggregate principal amount
of bonds or an elected institution would chair the Committee in its
negotiations with the debtor. Alternatively, staff in the Bondholder
Council might chair the Committee. This structure would give bond-
holders confidence to allow the council to restructure their bonds.
The problem would be to encourage every bondholder to submit their
bonds to its negotiating discretion. Confidence, together with the
methods discussed below in part C, could make this possible.
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(4) Funding a Bondholder Council
Issuing fees could provide funding.
How should councils be funded? Debt crises can be sudden di-
sasters punctuating long periods of stability or prolonged years of re-
petitive negotiation. Organizing funding for an institution with
unpredictable expenditure patterns will be difficult. Market regula-
tion, although expensive, does not have to be paid from central gov-
ernment funds. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for
example, receives funds from filing fees, essentially a direct levy upon
issuers and investors. Similarly, the funding necessary to institute a
bondholders council could be lifted from the issuance of the bonds. A
percentage fee would be paid from the price of sovereign debt securi-
ties when issued, calculated in the same way that the SEC calculates
its fees, but applying only to the issuance of bonds by foreign sover-
eign issuers. The premium paid by the issuers, underwriters and in-
vestors would reflect the costs of the future risk of managing default,
thus internalizing at an early stage the financial costs of organizing
negotiations. This would remove one of the disincentives of negotiat-
ing with a debtor - the organizational costs. It would be a form of
insurance for future crises. Alternatively, the bondholder council
could charge fees for organizing the Bondholder Negotiating Commit-
tee or take a percentage of the restructured debt payments, and main-
tain itself on its operating costs from previous renegotiations. The
unsteadiness of the debt crisis industry would make this method of
funding unpredictable and the council may not be financially stable
enough to be useful in practice. Perhaps a combination of an issuing
fee and a rescheduling fee would balance the anticipatory provision
for crises with the projected expenditure at the time.
C. Solidarity - Getting Bondholders to Agree
To make a council work, negotiations must be the best option for
bondholders.
To remedy the lack of solidarity outlined in Chapter II, the legal
structure of bondholder councils must make negotiations through the
council the most effective remedy for all of the bondholders. Histori-
cally, councils pressed defaulting governments to make payments, ne-
gotiating rescheduling agreements which they recommended to
bondholders. Bondholders had no option but to submit to the coun-
cils because they had no other way to obtain payments. They could
not sue the government debtors because foreign governments enjoyed
sovereign immunity in the U.S. and U.K. courts. Bondholders there-
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fore benefitted from collective action- the more bondholders who
joined together to pressure the debtor government, the more effective
such pressure would be. There was a clear solidarity of interests.
Bondholder councils could organize bondholders today, but to be
effective they must be made the best option for every bondholder. If
bondholders can pursue their rights more effectively by any other
means, such as in court, some of them may refuse to group together to
negotiate debt restructurings. If some investors refuse to cooperate,
this will undermine the effort of others.
(1) Variations on an Automatic Stay
Debtors might be granted sovereign immunity in a crisis...
James Hurlock has suggested that the law of sovereign immunity
in the U.S. and the U.K. might be altered to give debtors immunity
from lawsuits in a crisis.86 Bondholders would not be able to sue the
sovereign government because of the equivalent of the automatic stay
under the Bankruptcy Code. This would give bondholders the incen-
tive to negotiate a debt restructuring because, assuming no official
bailout was on the horizon, they would have no alternative means to
obtain their payments.
... but this produces a moral hazard...
The problem with this solution is that it tempts debtors to default
on their payments unjustifiably, knowing that they are immune from
legal pressures from their creditors. This problem is commonly called
the moral hazard and plagued the world of sovereign debt throughout
the 19th century. The moral hazard is avoided in domestic bankrupt-
cies by the oversight of the court which can reject applications for
bankruptcy and allows some creditor control of the bankrupt entity if
it is not acting in good faith. Hurlock suggests that the immunity from
suit should be dependent upon the good faith of the negotiators.
However, if courts in the United States, the United Kingdom and else-
where become empowered to review the good-faith of emerging mar-
ket countries, this may violate their sovereignty. The good faith of a
sovereign debtor and its creditors is more an economic and political
question than a legal one. The moral hazard might be contained for
sovereign debtors by conditioning immunity from suit upon an IMF
adjustment plan. Debtors would take economic measures designed to
restore debt servicing capability as recommended by the IMF because
they would not wish to subject themselves to the threat of disruptive
86 See Hurlock, The Way Ahead, supra note 52. See also Macmillan, The Next Sovereign
Debt Crisis, supra note 30.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:57 (1995)
law suits. However, this also introduces problems of sovereignty be-
cause the IMF would have enormous leverage over the country's eco-
nomic policies.
... and robs creditors of their legal rights.
Granting sovereign immunity would reverse the trend towards
making foreign governments legally accountable in their commercial
relationships with the private sector. Nearly all sovereign debt instru-
ments contain clauses whereby the debtor waives any immunity it
might have as a result of its sovereign status. Overriding such clauses
would trample on carefully developed creditor rights. It would also
change the nature of sovereign debt. Governments only default on
their debt in some form of crisis. If creditors cannot sue on the occa-
sion when a government defaults, the debt is arguably not meaning-
fully a legal obligation. Indeed, it could take sovereign debt back to
the 19th century when the courts refused to enforce the terms of sov-
ereign bonds on the ground that they were merely "engagements of
honour.
'87
This could be solved by centralizing legal rights in a bondholder
council...
One way to solve these two problems (removal of creditors'
rights and violations of national sovereignty) would be to allow the
creditors themselves to apply pressure on the debtor directly rather
than by expecting the IMF to do so. Rather than granting complete
immunity to the debtor, legislation might remove bondholders' rights
to sue but vest those rights collectively but exclusively in the bond-
holder council. Bondholders could still sue, but only collectively
through one organization. It would effectively make the council the
exclusive means for bondholders to obtain payments on their bonds.
This would give bondholders no choice but to submit their bonds to
the council which would then represent them in negotiations with the
debtors. It would create solidarity between bondholders who, having
collective action as their only solution, would pursue goals that were
in their collective interest.
Their collective interest would be served by a restructuring which
enables the country to resume its payments, stabilize its economy and
87 The English Court of Appeal summed up the situation in 1877:
[T]hese so-called bonds amount to nothing more than engagements of honour, binding, so
far as engagements of honour can bind, the government which issues them, but are not
contracts enforceable before the ordinary tribunals of any foreign government, or even by
the ordinary tribunals of the country which issued them, without the consent of the govern-
ment of that country.
Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch. D. 605, 616 (1877) (Jessel, M.R.).
Towards a Sovereign Debt
16:57 (1995)
build up foreign reserves. Bondholders' collective interests would not
be served by dragging the country through excruciating sacrifice which
would worsen its future debt servicing capability. They would cer-
tainly not benefit from bringing disruptive legal actions. The bond-
holder council would therefore be unlikely to sue for payment. A
determination of good faith would be made by the creditors them-
selves, with enlightened self interest. Only if the debtor was able but
unwilling to pay its debt would bondholders resort to a lawsuit in or-
der to bring pressure.
.. but not permanently - only in a debt crisis.
Debt crises are the exception in economic history. Most debtors
manage to continue servicing their debts even when in financial diffi-
culty. Giving a bondholder council permanent exclusive power to sue
on the bonds for all sovereign debt (including debt of industrialized
democracies?) would transform the nature of sovereign debt, making
it more restrictive than syndicated bank loans. Even banks in a syndi-
cate can sue on their portion of the whole loan. Bondholders would
not be a group of individuals but a permanently powerful creditor
body. For this reason, if bondholder councils were to be given such
exclusive power, it should only be in emergency situations. The trig-
ger would most naturally be a declaration (by the country or the IMF)
that the country was defaulting on its debt in good faith and that
bondholders should pursue a negotiated solution.
(2) Creditor Decisionmaking by Majority
A majority of bondholders might be authorized to reschedule debt
isues...
A second proposal comes from Barry Eichengreen and Richard
Portes who suggest that the disruptive bondholder could be overcome
if bondholders owning a majority in principal amount of the bonds
had the power to change the terms of the bonds.8 8 Currently, bonds
allow a majority to change their terms except for core terms governing
the amounts of interest and principal to be paid and the interest pay-
ment and maturity dates.8 9 This rules out comprehensive debt re-
structuring because it is extremely difficult to get unanimous
agreement on such questions. However, if new issues of sovereign
debt were changed to allow a majority of bondholders under each is-
sue to reschedule that entire issue of bonds, they argue that a debt
work-out would be much easier to achieve.
88 Eichengreen and Portes, Crisis, What Crisis?, supra note 45.
89 See Macmilan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, supra note 30, at 343.
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.. which makes sense for corporate debt...
Another comparison with corporate debt may illuminate some of
the implications of this proposal. The question of whether corporate
bondholders having a majority in principal amount of the bonds
should be able to change the core terms of the entire issue and
reschedule every holder's bond has been debated since the Trustee
Indenture Act of 1939. Before then, some indentures provided for
bondholders' meetings at which bondholders having a majority of be-
tween 51% and 75% in principal amount of the bonds could "assent
to and authorize any waiver, modification or compromise of the right
of the bondholders" and any such action would "be binding upon the
holder of all of the bonds."9 These did not, however, allow changes
to the core terms of payment amounts and dates. Some American and
British indentures, on the other hand, did allow bondholders at a
meeting to modify the obligations of the issuer to pay principal and
interest.91 The Securities and Exchange Commission report which led
to the 1939 Act argued that such terms did not give sufficient protec-
tion to minority dissenting bondholders.92 This was worsened by the
lack of responsibility taken on by the Indenture Trustee at that time.9 3
In order to protect such minorities, the 1939 Act provided that every
bondholder must consent to any changes to the core terms of its
bonds.94 (Of course this only applied - and still only applies - to
corporate debt and not sovereign debt.) This meant that any attempt
to reschedule the corporate bonds would probably fail, drive the
debtor into bankruptcy and result in a negotiated rescheduling super-
vised by the court, thereby guaranteeing fairness to minority bond-
holders. This has been criticized precisely because it makes voluntary
debt work-outs more difficult outside a bankruptcy proceeding.95
90 See SEC TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 135.
91 See SEC TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 143.
92 SEC TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 61. "... the dissenter may be remitted to the
mercy of a protective committee and the majority. The fate of minorities cannot fairly be left in
the hands of majorities and protective committees without control or restraint." SEC
TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 63.
93 "This inactivity of the trustee generally leaves minorities unrepresented ... Indeed, if the
minority bondholders do not constitute a sufficient percentage of the bonds to compel the
trustee to act, they may be absolutely at the mercy of the protective committees." SEC
TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 62.
94 "The indenture to be qualified shall provide that, notwithstanding any other provision
thereof, the right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the principal of
and interest on such indenture security, on or after the respective due dates expressed in such
indenture security ... shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder."
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (1982).
95 Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987).
Towards a Sovereign Debt
16:57 (1995)
There are two principal arguments in favor of changing the 1939
Act to allow maijority voting in corporate bonds. First, the concerns of
the SEC in 1939 are no longer valid today. The SEC was concerned
that creditors who were insiders (having some connection to the cor-
poration) might abuse their position if they could form a majority.
Today securities are traded so widely that insiders are unlikely to be a
danger.96 Second, now that two-thirds of the creditors in a bankruptcy
can override a minority in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding,
and do so without much intervention by the bankruptcy judge, there is
no protection left for minority creditors in the courtroom, which
makes protection outside the bankruptcy court pointless.97 If minority
protection is appropriate, the bankruptcy court is the appropriate
place, not the trust indenture.98
.. but may undercut creditors' rights too severely in sovereign debt...
The first of these arguments - that there is no need to protect
minority creditors from majority creditors - applies to some extent
to sovereign debt. There is no prospect of insiders cheating the mi-
nority. However, there are potentially significant dangers. The expe-
rience of the 1980s reminds us of potential disparities of interests
between creditors and of abuses of power by larger creditors. The
large banks pressured smaller banks to reschedule loans and provide
new money to debtors.99
The second argument - that the two-thirds majority in corpo-
rate bankruptcies makes the prohibition on voting in pre-bankruptcy
situations redundant - is translated weakly to sovereign debt crises.
In a corporate restructuring there is some general judicial oversight
and where there is none, there is significant control by creditors of the
debtor. The weak position of a minority creditor is compensated by
the generally strong position of the creditors as a body. In the sover-
eign debt context there is no judicial oversight and no creditor control
beyond IMF adjustment plans. Anything more than this would im-
96 Id
97 Id. at 255. "Since the principal impetus behind the Trust Indenture Act's prohibition was
to require judicial scrutiny in bankruptcy of a recapitalization plan, the prohibition's raison
d'etre is now gone."
98 Id. at 266.
99 Charles Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign
Debts, 38 WoRLD Poi- 200,203 (1985) (also in COOPERAnON UrNDEa ANARCHy (Kenneth Oye
ed., 1985)). The danger in which large U.S. banks found themselves in 1982 raised complicated
questions because the larger banks were often the agent banks in loan syndicates and had more
influence over the events than the smaller banks. Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure; A
Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 61-63 (1984).
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phmge on the sovereignty of the debtor state. The weaker position of a
sovereign debtor's creditors as a whole would put minority creditors
of a sovereign debtor in a much weaker position than minority credi-
tors of a corporate debtor. Without such independent judicial over-
sight and creditor influence - which are not possible in the sovereign
context - majority rule leaves minority bondholders in a very vulner-
able position.
Majority control may be too drastic for the same reason that an
automatic stay using sovereign immunity is too drastic. It undercuts
creditors' legal rights. The individual bondholder becomes subject to
the majority without so choosing. Some protection for minority bond-
holders is necessary.
... and an arbitration tribunal would not help address minority creditor
grievances.
Eichengreen and Portes address this problem by suggesting that
an arbitration tribunal be created to deal with such complaints by
bondholders.' But in addition to the effort involved in setting up
another institution, it is difficult to see what it could contribute in this
context. Their concern appears to be to remove such disputes from
the courts because court cases disrupt negotiations. But an arbitration
tribunal will not solve this problem. Arbitration tribunals simply re-
move decision making from courts and place it in the hands of party-
selected arbitrators. The arbitrators then make a decision according
to the law of the contract under dispute. If the bonds give a majority
the power to change the terms of the bonds, arbitrators would have to
allow that the majority bondholders could do so. An arbitration tribu-
nal for aggrieved bondholders would give them no redress or comfort:
it would only tie them up in prolonged and expensive proceedings.
Moreover, there is no reason why an arbitration proceeding by a mi-
nority of bondholders would disrupt negotiations any less than would
a court case. Arbitral awards are usually immediately enforceable as
if they were judicial judgments. Thus it makes no difference whether
such disputes are handled in a court or by an arbitral tribunal. In
either case they will disrupt negotiations.
Majority rule could only cover future debt...
Changing the covenants in the documents has two other
problems. First, it only governs new issues. What about debt that is
already on the market? Much sovereign debt - Brady Bonds for ex-
100 See Eichengreen and Portes, Crisis, What Crisis?, supra note 45, at 41.
100
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ample - will not mature until as late as 2025. We need a solution that
will cover all sovereign debt, whether issued or not.
.and is too discretionary, though legislation could make it
comprehensive.
Second, it relies upon the sovereign debtor to draft the debt in-
struments with such clauses. Debtors may try to do so because it is in
their interest to make reschedulings easier. But risk factors in buying
the securities have to be disclosed to investors. Securities which ex-
plicitly tell bondholders that other bondholders may revise their rights
without their consent might not be marketable or may simply cost the
debtor too much in its selling price. To work, majority rule would
have to be a comprehensive public policy solution: otherwise some
debtors might insert such clauses and others might not. In a regional
crisis, we might end up with one country's debt being nicely renegoti-
ated while another's lurches from one chaotic problem to the next.
Just as the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires corporate bonds to
contain certain clauses, the Act might be changed to require that sov-
ereign debt contain clauses allowing a majority of bondholders to
change the time and amount of payments.
However, a better solution than majority rule would be one
wherein every bondholder has an interest in reaching a collective solu-
tion without minority dissent. In the next section, I show how this
could be achieved without completely overriding minority creditors'
rights.
(3) Engineering Solidarity
Sharing obligations would raise the threshold for the disruptive
bondholder...
The absence of a centralized judicial bankruptcy system requires
that the "collectivization goal" be introduced and imposed from else-
where. Creditor solidarity must arise from economic and legal rela-
tionships rather than crude judicial enforcement. It has been and still
is entirely possible to manipulate these to produce the required result.
Some features of the debt crisis of the 1980s may provide an effective
solution. One of the most important causes of solidarity then was the
obligation upon banks to share any payments made directly to them
with the other banks in the syndicate.1 1 This meant that any bank
101 "While the loan agreement contemplates that payments by the borrower will be made to
the agent for the benefit of the members of the syndicate, there are times when individual mem-
bers may directly receive payment on their note. The borrower may make a voluntary payment
to the bank, but more likely the bank will exercise its right of setoff to satisfy all or a portion of
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bringing a lawsuit had to disburse any amounts it received equally
among the other banks.102 This was one of the main reasons that so
many reschedulings could be negotiated throughout the 1980s.
If bondholders were required to share any payments received
from a court judgment, they would have no great incentive to pursue
their claims unless they were doing so collectively. A sharing obliga-
tion could be imposed by simple legislation. It would not remove the
legal rights of the bondholders but it would collectivize their interests.
It does not completely remove the threat of an individual bondholder
bringing a lawsuit: a bondholder could still sue in order to bring pres-
sure upon other bondholders to take the suing bondholder's views
into account. But it does reduce the interest in suing and so raises the
cost-benefit threshold for the maverick bondholder.
.. .and consolidating all legal proceedings would increase creditor
solidarity.
In order to develop creditor solidarity towards unanimity, two ad-
ditional methods could be used. A complementary idea for collectiv-
izing bondholders' interests would be to require that all legal actions
over the bonds be consolidated into a single action. In the event of a
dispute, the effect of this would be that bondholders will make deci-
sions together with regard to their collective interest rather than each
bondholder making an individual decision in its own interest. Such
provisions have been used before in bond documents when the provi-
sions refer disputes to arbitration. An agreement may provide that a
bondholder, by bringing a proceeding against the debtor or a collat-
eral agent, consents to the consolidation of its arbitration with any
the borrower's obligations to that bank. One of the assumptions in entering into a syndicated
agreement is that each of the banks will share ratably all payments made by the borrower based
on the amount of the loans outstanding to the borrower by all members of the syndicate. To
ensure that all banks share payments by the borrower on a ratable basis, a procedure must be
established for payments received outside the normal payment mechanisms of the loan agree-
ment. This provision [the sharing clause] requires that if a bank receives such a payment, it will
purchase a participation in the outstanding loans to the borrower by all the other member banks
in the syndicate in an amount that will give each syndicate member its appropriate ratable share
of the payment received from the borrower." SANDRA Sca'NrrzER STERN, STRUCTURING COM-
MERCIAL LOAN AGREEMENTS 10-20 (2d ed. 1990).
102 Buchheit, supra note 33, at 15. See also, Buchheit & Reisner, Inter-Creditor Issues, supra
note 11, at 46. Moreover, mandatory prepayment clauses applied not only within a single syndi-
cate, but between syndicates, so that any payments made before obligations were due had to be
ratably shared among all creditors. Additionally, cross-default clauses-whereby a default in
any one loan agreement signaled a default in other syndicated loan agreements-may have mul-
tiplied the number of creditors with a right to accelerate their loans to the point that it was
impracticable for any single syndicate to take action, creating an effective automatic stay. See
Buchheit & Reisner, Inter-Creditor Issues, supra note 11, at 48.
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other such arbitrations. This means that all arbitrations under that
agreement will be consolidated so that the bondholders become a sin-
gle party in the dispute. Legislation could require bondholders suing
a foreign government to bring one single lawsuit together in the same
way.
With a minimum requirement of bondholders to bring a lawsuit...
A third method could be used to tighten bondholder solidarity.
Rather than allowing a majority to restructure all of the bonds as
Eichengreen and Portes suggest, legislation could require that a mini-
mum amount of the bondholders is required to bring a lawsuit. Just as
a minimum percentage (usually 25%) of bondholders is required to
accelerate the debt in the event of default, a minimum amount would
be required if they wanted to go to court. This would still mean that
bondholders could sue, but would require that if they wish to do so,
they must work together. Similar provisions have existed in inden-
tures in the distant past.10 3
A percentage as low as 10% might be sufficient to make a lawsuit
counter-productive to the plaintiffs. If such a large amount of bond-
holders wanting to sue the debtor had to consolidate their cases as
one, it would obviously be contrary to their interests to drive the
debtor's financial position into the ground. A judgment for millions
of dollars would be unrealistic to pay and would make it harder for
the debtor to raise money elsewhere. The value of bonds depends
partly upon the debtor's future ability to make payments. In the ab-
sence of new money, payments would only be possible by debt
rescheduling or debt reduction. For these reasons, bondholders would
be more likely to seek a compromise whereby the debtor's liquidity
were eased, allowing renegotiated bond payments to resume.
.. this would result in a collective approach to the crisis...
None of these things alone would guarantee creditor solidarity,
but taken together they would align the interests of bondholders so
that they operate together and come to a collective position in negoti-
ations with the debtor. The individual bondholder would be pushed
to think of the collective interest rather than its individual short term
gain. If a bondholder council were in operation, it would soon have
the agreement of all bondholders to negotiate a restructuring.
103 An indenture before the court in Allan v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1926),
provided that no noteholder could sue unless the trustee refused to do so after demand by hold-
ers of 25 percent of the outstanding notes. SEC TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 82, at 62.
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... which avoids the moral hazard without trampling on creditors'
rights.
This solution has two principal advantages over other sugges-
tions. First, it does not remove the contractual rights under the bonds
from the bondholders. They can still bring lawsuits but must do so as
a group. Second, it does not introduce violations of sovereignty be-
cause it does not require an independent judgment from any institu-
tion to set a process of negotiations going. Upon intimation of a
request for debt negotiations from the debtor, the bondholders would
use the organizational mechanisms of the council to act together and
negotiate with the debtor. It also avoids the moral hazard problem. If
they still had the legal right to sue the debtor, they could use this
together to discourage the debtor from unjustifiably defaulting on its
debt. On the other hand, if the debtor was plainly unable to pay its
debts, the creditors would be able to negotiate collectively without
any danger of disruption from individual creditors.
VI. NEw MONEY: A POSTSCRIPr
If a debtor has liquidity problems and cannot meet its debt obli-
gations, the debtor usually needs to borrow in order to maintain debt
payments and ongoing financial operations. This is so even where
debt is rescheduled. As I explained in Chapter II, in a debt crisis,
lenders lose confidence and refuse to make money available.
Involuntary lending supplied new money in the 1980s...
The same political pressures that restrained banks from initiating
lawsuits and pushed them into debt reschedulings during the 1980s
also forced unwilling banks to lend more to the debtor governments.
The lead banks called upon all of the creditor banks to lend new
money in proportion to their existing exposure. Today, however,
bondholders would refuse to increase their exposure based upon their
holdings of outstanding debt. Many bondholders are institutional
pension funds or other investors which are not even in the business of
lending. Moreover, the expectations of the market have changed. For
instance, after the experience of the 1980s, Brady Bonds explicitly
prohibit the debtors from calling upon bondholders to lend new
money.
... but today new money would need some legal priority...
There are three obvious sources of new lending. The first is to
tap official sources, as Mexico did in early 1995. As I explained in
Chapter II, making government money the main resource for liquidity
is an unsustainable and expensive way to spend public funds.
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Although a significant contribution can be made by institutions such
as the IMF, the resources of the private sector must be harnessed.
The second source is from new debt issues. However, it was six
months before Mexico was able to raise money on the capital mar-
kets.'0 4 It was only able to do so because it already had the official
backing of the US government and the IMF. Six months is too long a
period for a government to wait to secure lending in a crisis.
The third possible source is from commercial banks. Lenders will
only expose themselves to a risky debtor if there is some indication of
repayment. Where there is a "lender of last resort," the commercial
lender can have confidence of repayment even if the debtor en-
counters difficulties. Governments have increased the IMF's funds to
enhance this function. There is an alternative situation whereby pri-
vate lenders can be induced to lend to a struggling debtor. Jeffrey
Sachs has argued that a mechanism is needed to give potential credi-
tors confidence that their new debt would be repaid ahead of the out-
standing debt.'0 5 If the rescuing new money takes priority over the
old debt, commercial banks may be induced to lend.
.. which leadership, coordination and solidarity could produce.
The problem in today's financial system is in getting creditors to
agree to subordinate their outstanding debt to new money. Doing so
means increasing the risk that the new debt will be repaid without
leaving sufficient resources to pay off the old debt. However, without
new money, even with a rescheduling the immediate payments on
bonds may be jeopardized; Giving the new money priority would pro-
vide the liquidity to make payments flow again on their outstanding
debt. The problems with securing such liquidity are the same as those
which make it difficult to renegotiate the outstanding debt. There is
no legal provision to impose such a priority on new debt. However, as
I have shown in this article, there are alternatives to a court imposed
legal structure in work-outs. If the incentives of existing creditors can
be aligned so that prioritized new money is in their collective interest
because there is no alternative, then they will agree to a restricted
subordination of their own debt. The need then is to have leadership,
coordination and solidarity of interests. If a procedure or institution
for coordinated representation existed, and if there were a clear soli-
darity of interests, it would be within the creditors' collective interest
to subordinate their outstanding debt to the new money. Thus, if the
underlying problems of a debt restructuring were solved, the require-
104 See note 4.
105 See Sachs, supra note 47.
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ment of new money should fall into place. If this should fail, legisla-
tion in countries whose laws apply to the terms of the debt could
provide that following a debt restructuring agreement any new lend-
ing to the country will have legal priority. A time restriction - per-
haps six months - might apply. This would encourage the parties to
reach a restructuring agreement because lenders would be waiting in
the wings to lend.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems in restructuring sovereign debt result from inade-
quacies in the international legal order. Despite numerous popular
arguments that the nation state is becoming obsolete because capital
and trade flows make borders irrelevant, the legal structure is far from
supranational. Numerous commissions and quasi-courts exist, but
with the notable exception of the Court of Justice in the European
Union, these are either subject to political influence so that the rule of
law is weak (like the International Court of Justice) or they are spe-
cialized technical tribunals (like the World Trade Organization).
Trade in bananas and washing machines can be regulated by decision
makers whose discretion and susceptibility to political influence is
constrained to some extent by the rule of law. But, the enormity of a
sovereign debt crisis makes it very difficult to ensure that discretion
and political influence are isolated and decisions are made according
to neutral criteria.
For this reason I have sought to construct a system in which the
parties involved in a crisis can act with enlightened self interest to
pursue collective goals. The most obvious way to do this is usually to
have laws of a common sovereign authority regulating behaviour, but
this is not possible in today's international order. I have shown that
the legal, institutional and economic relations between the parties can
be structured so that an alignment of interests achieves the same goals
of a domestic bankruptcy system. Having an Indenture Trustee for
sovereign debt is an obvious - and somewhat belated - suggestion.
Developing bondholder councils requires significantly more careful
thought but has been done before and is therefore demonstrably pos-
sible. Creditor solidarity may be achieved by an intricate set of legal
provisions, some of which were shown to work during the 1980s. In
today's framework, a debt restructuring is next to impossible. Current
suggestions are either impractical or expensive. The initiatives I have
recommended in this article would transform the situation without
great effort by or cost to any government.
